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VOLUME 26 DECEMBER 1974 NUMBER 3
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
PROPERTY TAX IN SOUTH CAROLINA
WILIAM J. QUIRK*
WILLIAM W. WATKINS**
On May 23, 1974, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in a
three to two decision, held that the South Carolina Constitution
permits the classification of real property for purposes of property
taxation.' Consequently, Spartanburg County was allowed to
impose a heavier effective rate of tax on property used for manu-
facturing purposes than for other real property in the county. The
majority observed:
We find nothing in our Constitution that prohibits the General
Assembly of this State from classifying property according to its
use so long as such classification is reasonable and not arbitrary,
and the tax imposed is uniform on the same class of property.
2
The majority also found that the federal equal protection clause
was not violated, quoting with approval the following language:
It is elementary that if the classification bears a reasonable
relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected, and if
all the members of each class are treated alike under similar
circumstances, the equal protection clauses of the [federal and
state] Constitutions are fully complied with.3
There can be no disagreement with the court's conclusion that the
South Carolina system is valid under equal protection standards.
However, its conclusion of validity under the state constitution
ignores the language of four provisions and the distinctive consti-
tutional history which brought those four provisions into being.
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina Law Center; A.B., 1956, Princeton
University; LL.B., 1959, University of Virginia.
** Third-year student, University of South Carolina Law Center; B.S., 1968, Univer-
sity of South Carolina.
1. Holzwasser v. Brady, 205 S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 1974).
2. Id. at 704.
3. Id., quoting from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, 215 F.2d 542 (4th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955). 1
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The federal equal protection clause, of course, restrains the
state from enacting an unreasonable or arbitrary tax scheme.
Clearly, in the majority's view, the state constitution imposes no
additional restraints on the legislature. The only relevant issue
then becomes whether a taxing system is arbitrary in a fourteenth
amendment sense. If it can pass this standard it will be upheld
by the South Carolina courts. This is not a rigorous standard,
particularly in a tax context. Indeed, according to the United
States Supreme Court, a state taxing scheme will be upheld un-
less it is "palpably arbitrary."' Only a whimsical system is forbid-
den.5
4. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).
5. In 1973, the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois constitutional provision which taxed
tangible personal property owned by a corporation and exempted tangible personal prop-
erty owned by an individual. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356
(1973). The plaintiff argued that such a distinction violated the equal protection clause
in view of Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928), which held that a
gross receipts tax could not be imposed upon corporations engaged in the taxi business
unless a tax was also imposed upon partnerships and individuals engaged in the same
business. Justice Douglas, however, wrote that Quaker City was "only a relic of a bygone
era." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. at 365 (1973). In view of
Lehnhausen, it seems unlikely that any state classification will be violative of equal
protection. The Court, per Justice Douglas, stated:
Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal
protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications
and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxa-
tion.
Id. at 359.
The Court then quoted favorably from Allied Stores:
The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. When dealing
with their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives
of the National Government or violating the guaranties of the Federal Constitu-
tion, the States have the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal
systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Of course, the States,
in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no
iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate
to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State may impose different specific
taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon
various products. It is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain
a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value.
Id. at 359-60.
Justice Douglas then added:
In that case [Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)] we used the
phrase "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious" as defining the limits placed by the
Equal Protection Clause on state power. Id., at 530. State taxes which have the
collateral effect of restricting or even destroying an occupation or a business
have been sustained, so long as the regulatory power asserted is properly within
the limits of the federal-state regime created by the Constitution.
Id. at 360.
2
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The dissenting justices believed that the state constitution
had been violated. They noted:
If real property could be classified by the General Assembly into
two sub-categories, one for manufacturers, and one for non-
manufacturers. . it could be sub-classified into three, or six,
or a dozen, or fifty, or more. . . .The equality provisions of the
State Constitution would thus be reduced to a shambles. It was
to avoid that very evil, in my judgment, that the framers of the
Constitution wrote the uniformity requirement into that instru-
ment, not once, but four times.'
The four provisions mentioned are as follows:
(1) Article III, section 29, originating in the 1865 constitu-
tion provides:
All taxes upon property, real and personal shall be laid upon the
actual value of the property taxed, as the same shall be ascer-
tained by an assessment made for the purpose of laying such
tax .
7
(2) Article X, section 3A, originating in the 1868 constitu-
tion provides:
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to
its value.8
(3) Article X, section 1, originating in the 1868 constitution
provides:
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe regu-
lations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property,
real, personal and possessory, except mines and mining claims,
the products of which alone shall be taxed; and also excepting
such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educa-
tional, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.'
If any question remained as to the weakness of the equal protection standard, it was
removed by Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974), where the Court upheld a Florida
statute granting a $500 property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers.
6. Holzwasser v. Brady, 205 S.E.2d 701, 706-07 (S.C. 1974). The dissent is here
quoting from the opinion of the lower court which had found the statute unconstitutional.
7. This article was art. I, § 8 of the 1865 constitution and art. II, § 33 of the 1868
constitution.
8. This article was art. I, § 36 of the 1868 constitution, and art. I, § 6 of the 1895
constitution. See No. 276, [1971] 57 S.C. Stat. 315.
9. This article was art. IX, § 1 of the 1868 constitution and is currently art. X, § 1.
3
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(4) Article X, section 5(1), originating in the 1868 constitu-
tion, provides:
The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school dis-
tricts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to
assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be
uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdic-
tion of the body imposing the same. .... 1.
All of the above provisions came into the constitution in
either 1865 or 1868. Their purpose becomes clear when viewed in
the context of the state's fiscal history prior to that time. Certain
very specific problems existed which the draftsmen of the consti-
tutional provisions sought to solve. As noted, the Holzwasser
opinion found that these provisions did not restrain the legisla-
ture. It was restrained by the federal equal protection clause but
no further. However, the history is clear that the framers of these
provisions did not believe they were duplicating the federal four-
teenth amendment. They thought they were addressing them-
selves to abuses which had arisen in the state's taxing system and
preventing the repetition of such abuses in the future.
I.
COLONIAL HISTORY
Prior to the 1865 and 1868 amendments, the power of the
legislature with respect to taxation was complete. The state's
early constitutions of 1776, 1778 and 1790 placed no limitations
on the taxing power." In the absence of specific restraints, the
supreme court has noted:
It is elementary, of course, that the power of the Legislature is
plenary in the absence of any constitutional limitation, that a
State Constitution is not a grant of power but rather a limitation
of legislative power, and that the right to tax is not granted by
the Constitution.
Except insofar as it is limited by the State and Federal Consti-
tutions, this taxing power of the State is general and absolute
and extends to all persons, property, and business within its
jurisdiction or reach.'"
10. This article was art. IX, § 8 of the 1868 constitution.
11. The text of the 1776 constitution can be found at 1 S.C. Stat. 128; the 1778
constitution at 1 S.C. Stat. 137; and the 1790 constitution at I S.C. Stat. 184.
12. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 166 S.C. 117, 136-37; 164 S.E. 588, 595 (1931) (cita-
tions ommitted).
[Vol. 26
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
https://sch larco mons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss3/7
PROPERTY TAX
Consequently, the early period is one of legislative supremacy
undisturbed by any constitutional limits. 3
Prior to the American Revolution all land was taxed at a
fixed rate per acre regardless of quality, type or use. The historian
David Ramsay, writing in 1808, states:
From the first settlement of the province till that period [1783]
the lands had been uniformly taxed according to quantity with-
out regard to quality. A hundred acres of pine barren and a
hundred acres of the most highly cultivated tide swamp, paid
the same tax. The owners of the former were clamorous for an
alteration so as to make quality as well as quantity a ground of
taxation. The owners of the latter were very slowly convinced of
the practicability of the discrimination, though they acknowl-
edged its justice."
In 1751, Colonial Governor Glen reported that the fixed rate per
acre method of taxation was a "great burden and injustice to
many owners."" The system, he wrote, should be reformed so
that taxes would be imposed "in proportion to value."" The Gov-
ernor stated:
Taxes are the same on all negroes, and the same on all lands per
acre, to the great burden and injustice to many owners. Quit-
rents are usually three shillings sterling a hundred acres, and
taxes about two shillings a hundred acres. I have often urged
that taxes should be in proportion to value, as, for instance, a
tax being imposed on the produce exported. 7
An example of the system criticized by the Governor is found
in Act No. 360 of 1716.1 This act was intended to raise 95,000
pounds, over a three year period, in order to finance Indian wars. 9
13. Interestingly, for all practical purposes, the Holzwasser opinion brings the state
around full circle to a new period of legislative supremacy.
14. 2 D. RAMSAY, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 107 (1st ed. 1858). See also I D.
WALLACE, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 453 (1934).
15. 1 D. WALLACE, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 451 (1934) [hereinafter cited as [D.
WALLACE]].
16. Id.
17. Id. Governor Glen's view that property should be taxed "in proportion to value"
was adopted by the 1865 constitution, art. I, § 8 and is presently found in the constitution
at art. III, § 29 and art. X, § 3A. Its function, however, after Holzwasser, is questionable.
18. No. 360, [1716] 2 S.C. Stat. 662.
19. Id.
1974]
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The fixed rate per acre provision, found in section XXIV, directed
the assessors "to impose and assess thereon five shillings for every
hundred acres which shall be so returned."20 If the designated
sum was not raised by the land tax the assessors were to collect
the deficiency, "by way of poll, or so much per head on all and
every the negro and Indian slaves, mustees and mulattoes, ac-
cording to the numbers belonging to each inhabitant."2' The third
source of wealth in the Province, the Charleston merchants, was
also reached by the act. Noting that a tax on land and slaves
would substantially exempt this group, the statute separately
apportioned 16,000 pounds of the 95,000 pound total to the citi-
zens of Charleston.22 The 16,000 pounds were to be "equally and
indifferently imposed, levied and raised on the real and personal
estates, stocks and abilities of the several merchants and other
inhabitants, living or residing with the limits of the town plot of
Charleston . . . . "2 As a result citizens outside of Charleston
were taxed on their land and slaves while the merchants of
Charleston were taxed on their buildings, stock in trade and other
personal property.
The 1716 act was a comprehensive taxing statute establish-
ing procedures for the reporting of property, appeals and the
collection of the tax. The penalty for concealing property was
forfeiture. 24 In addition such a person was, upon conviction, sub-
ject to the "same punishment as in the case of wilful perjury."'
'
The earlier taxing statutes were not as elaborate. Only the
title has survived from the first tax act of record, that of June 8,
1682.28 The act was entitled, "An Act for raising a Tax of £400,
or the value thereof, for defraying the publick charges of this
Province."-" The earliest surviving text of a tax act is that of
October 15, 1686. This act provided for the raising of 500 pounds
to repel the invasion of "subjects of the King of Spaine." These
subjects had,
[L]ately in a barbarous and hostile manner, invaded us his
majestie's subjects, inhabitants of that parte of this province
20. Id. at 671.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 667-68.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 669.
25. Id.
26. No. 5, [16821 2 S.C. Stat. Table of Contents.
27. Id.
28. No. 30, [1685] 2 S.C. Stat. 15.
[Vol. 26
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which lyeth to the South and Westward of Cape Feare, and
under this Government, burning our houses, killing our stock,
cutting off our crops and provisions, murdering and making
prisoners as many of us as by the unexpectedness of the at-
tempt, had not the opportunity to escape, and are still designing
and contriving our utter ruin and the subversion of this govern-
ment; for the more speedy prevention thereof, and the better to
enable us to defend ourselves against and repel these our ene-
mies. 9
This statute lacks the comprehensive and sophisticated pro-
visions found in the 1716 act. Essentially, the Assessors were
simply to collect the 500 pounds from the inhabitants "according
to their several estates, stores and abilities." In more complete
form, the statute provided:
And the charge of this present expedition may bee equally and
indifferently borne by the respective freeholders, and others the
inhabitants of this Province, Bee it further enacted, by the au-
thority aforesaid, that a tax of five hundred pounds sterling bee
equally assessed, imposed and leavyed upon the severall inhab-
itants, merchants and others, (not servants for tyme or terme of
yeares,) which now are, or herafter shall come into this province
before this assessment shall be made, (Seaman excepted,) ac-
cording to their several estates, stores and abilities, and accord-
ing to the profits indifferently computed of every publicque offi-
cer, arising from, or by his respective office or any other imploy-
ment whatsoever, to be collected and paid in the manner herein-
after mentioned.2 0
The language of this early statute is not entirely clear, but it
seems to have imposed a tax "equally and indifferently" upon the
actual value of real and personal property.
3 1
Five years later, in 1691, the province imposed a duty on the
export of all skins and furs. 2 An export duty was probably less
likely to aggravate the citizenry than a property tax. In any event,
Ramsay notes that the duty must have produced substantial rev-
enue since no tax ac;s appear of record for ten years after the duty
was imposed.
33
29. Id.
30. Id. at 15-16.
31. The use of the phrase "equally and indifferently" in both the 1686 and 1716 acts
will be noted.
32. No. 73, [1691] 2 S.C. Stat. 64.
33. 2 D. RAmSAY, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 90 (lst ed. 1858).
1974]
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The first years of the eighteenth century saw a tremendous
increase in the amount of taxes collected. Between 1682 and 1700
only 2,320 pounds were collected compared with 215,000 pounds
in the next eighteen year period, 1700-1718.11 Ramsay explains
the need for increased revenues as follows:
The abortive expedition against Augustine - the invasion of the
province by Feboure - the expedition under Col. Barnwell
against the Tuscarora Indians of North Carolina - the Yamasee
war and the suppression of the pirates, all took place between
1701 and 1719, and drew after them debt, taxes, paper-money
and depreciation.A'
As a result of the increased demands on the tax structure, the
informal approach taken by the act of 1686 was replaced by the
more elaborate approach of the 1716 act. As noted, the 1716 act
imposed a tax of "five shillings for every hundred acres" regard-
less of the actual value of the land.
II.
REVOLUTIONARY AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
(1776-1865)
The injustice discussed above by Governor Glen was termi-
nated shortly after the Revolution. The historian David Wallace
reports:
Amid the mass of laws reorganizing the life of the State after the
Revolution was that of 1784 classifying land into town lots and
nine classes in the country according to its value for taxation,
thus ending the abuse so bitterly resented by the back country-
men of their new grounds 200 miles from Charleston being taxed
at the same rate as the richest rice field close to market. The
taxable values thus established ranged from 20 cents to $26 an
acre - one to 130, instead of the former equality. Modified during
the next 31 years, this classification lasted through the War of
Secession. Equitable when adopted, the unchanged valuations
through the generations themselves became an injustice. 6
The classification system was a step toward the actual value sys-
tem later adopted by'the 1865 constitution.
The first of the classification statutes was Act No. 1234 of
34. Id. at 90-91.
35. Id. at 91.
36. 2 D. WALLAcE at 336.
[Vol. 26
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1784.11 It imposed a one percent ad valorem tax on all lands "in
the manner and under the several regulations hereinafter set
forth" in nine general classifications (most of the nine classes
contain subclassifications). The relevant factors were the nature
of the land and its location. For example, Class No. 1, with its
subclassifications, reads as follows:
No. 1, all tide swamp, not generally affected by the salts or
freshets, of the first quality, shall stand rated at six pounds per
acre; all tide swamp of the second quality, four pounds per acre;
of third quality, two pounds per acre; all pine barren lands
adjoining such swamp, or contiguous thereto, with respect to the
benefit of water carriage, at ten shillings per acre; all prime
inland swamp, cultivated and uncultivated, at an average of
three pounds per acre; second quality of swamp, cultivated and
uncultivated at an average of two pounds per acre; third quality
swamp, cultivated and uncultivated, at an average of one pound
per acre; pine barren lands adjoining or contiguous thereto, salt
marsh or inland swamp, clearly proved to the assessors to be
incapable of immediate cultivation, five shillings per acre.,,
Class No. 9, involving the northern part of the state, refers
to: "all oak and hickory high lands above the old Indian bound-
ary, the first quality six shillings per acre; the second quality
three shillings per acre, the third quality, one shilling per acre."39
Consequently in accord with market value at the time, the
rice lands on the coast paid a much heavier tax than land in the
northern part of the state. Under this system, the assessors had
a degree of discretion, e.g., in determining if land was of the first
quality or second, but essentially the legislature, by statute, fixed
the value.
In the years following 1784, the statute discussed above was
annually re-enacted.0 In 1815 the land classification system was
separately enacted as a "permanent" system. 41 The 1815 statute
37. No. 1234, [1784] 4 S.C. Stat. 627, as amended, No. 1260, [1785] 4 S.C. Stat.
647.
38. Id. § 1. The statute also contained a separate method of taxing town lots, i.e.,
"the sum of one per cent. on every hundred pounds value of every such lot, wharf, or other
lands, and on all buildings within the limits of any town, village, or borough in this
State ... " Id. § 11, 628. In addition, certain personal property was subject to the same
rate of "the sum of one per cent. upon every hundred pounds upon every persons stock in
trade, of persons in trade, shopkeepers and others." Id.
39. Id., § 1.
40. See, e.g., No. 1284, [1785] 4 S.C. Stat. 689; No. 1312, [1786] 4 S.C. Stat. 728;
and No. 1370, [1787] 5 S.C. Stat. 24.
41. No. 2079, [1815] 6 S.C. Stat. 7. The term "permanent" does not, of course, mean
1974]
9
Quirk and Watkins: A Constitutional History of the Property Tax in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is included here in its entirety since it was the basis of the taxing
system for fifty years. The classification ranges from $26 per acre
for "tide swamps of the first quality" to 20 cents per acre for
certain "pine barrens." It provided:
That all the lands within this State shall be, and they are here-
by, distributed and divided among the following classes:
Class No. 1 shall contain all the tide swamp of the first
quality, not generally affected by salts or freshets, which shall
be rated at twenty-six dollars per acre; all tide swamp of the
second quality, not generally affected by salts or freshets, which
that the statute could not be repealed. Rather, the 1815 Act separated the classification
system from the annual taxing act. The classification act could be changed but the
legislature gave it some protection by assuring that changes would not be considered under
the stress of enacting the annual tax act.
The operative taxing act then simply had to establish the rate of tax and cross refer
to the classification system which would establish value. For example, section II of Act
No. 2094 of 1815 provided:
That forty-five cents ad valorem on every hundred dollars, be paid in specie,
paper medium, or in notes of the incorporated banks of the State of South
Carolina, on all lands granted within this State.
No. 2094, [18151 6 S.C. Stat. 19, § I.
The same statute imposed a forty-five cent per hundred dollars tax on the value of
all lots and lands and buildings within any city, town, village or borough. Id. § I. See
Martin v. Tax Collector of St. Luke's Parish, 1 Speers 343, 345 (S.C. 1843) for a discussion
of what is a "village." Quite clearly, the standard of value imposed on such town lots was
actual value.
A higher rate of tax was imposed on a merchant's stock in trade: one dollar per
hundred dollars of value. No. 2094, [1815] 6 S.C. Stat. 19, § II.
The statute also imposed what seems to.be an early gross receipts or income tax, of
one dollar per hundred dollars on "employments, faculties and professions." Id. For simi-
lar annual statutes see No. 2128, [1816] 6 S.C. Stat. 45 and No. 2173, [1817] 6 S.C. Stat.
81.
The general tax act of 1788 (No. 1383, [1788] 5 S.C. Stat. 50) established the proce-
dural rules for the assessment and collection of taxes. For a discussion of this act see Butler
v. Baily, 2 Bay 244 (S.C. 1800). Butler involved the paramount nature of the state's lien
for taxes. In reaching its conclusion, the court expounded a general theory of government
and taxes as follows:
That the soil of every country, and all the property of the inhabitants thereof,
by the nature of the social compact, and the fundamental principles of every
well regulated government stood pledged, and were liable for the support and
defense of the state, and its government, to the extent which might be necessary
for such defense and protection; and without such aid and assistance, the gov-
ernment could not be maintained and kept up, nor the state protected. In return
for which, the government on its part, was bound to support and protect every
individual citizen within the limits of the state, in all their rights and privileges,
in peace and tranquility; and in order to accomplish this great end effectually,
there was nothing which it [the government] ought not to hazard, either of
blood or treasure, which might tend to secure and perpetuate these inestimable
blessings. Hence, the origin of those great and reciprocal duties of allegiance and
protection, and hence also, the origin of taxes and taxation.
Id. at 249.
[Vol. 26
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shall be rated at seventeen dollars per acre; all tide swamp of
the third quality, not generally affected by salts or freshets,
which shall be rated at eight dollars and fifty cents per acre; all
pine barren lands adjoining such swamps, or contiguous thereto
with respect to the benefit of water carriage which shall be rated
at two dollars per acre; all prime inland swamp, cultivated and
uncultivated, which shall be rated at an average of thirteen
dollars per acre; all inland swamp of the second quality, which
shall be rated at eight dollars and fifty cents per acre; all inland
swamp of the third quality, which shall be rated at four dollars
per acre; all pine barren lands adjoining or contiguous thereto,
which shall be rated at one dollar per acre; and all salt marsh,
or inland swamp, clearly proved to the collectors to be incapable
of immediate cultivation, which shall be rated at one dollar per
acre.
Class No. 2 shall comprehend all high river swamp and low
ground cultivated, including such as are commonly called
second low grounds, lying above the flow of the tides, and as
high up the country as Snow Hill on Savannah river, and the
fork of Broad and Saluda rivers on the Congaree, Grave's Ford
on the Wateree, and the boundary line on Pedee; the first qual-
ity to be rated at thirteen dollars per acre; the second quality
at eight dollars and fifty cents per acre; the third quality at four
dollars per acre; excepting such as may be clearly proven to the
collectors to be incapable of immediate cultivation, which shall
be rated at one dollar per acre.
Class No. 3 shall comprehend all high river swamps and low
grounds lying above Snow Hill and the fork of Broad and Saluda
rivers, Graves's Ford on the Wateree, and the Old Indian bound-
ary line on Pedee, which shall be rated at three dollars per acre.
Class No. 4 shall comprehend all high lands without the
limits of St. Philip's and St. Michael's parishes, within twenty
miles of Charleston, and on John's Island and James's Island,
which shall be rated at four dollars per acre.
Class No. 5 shall comprehend all lands lying on the sea
islands, (Slann's island included,) or lying on or contiguous to
the seashore, usually cultivated, or capable of cultivation, in
corn, cotton or indigo, not within the limits prescribed in Class
No. 4, which shall be rated at four dollars per acre.
Class No. 6 shall comprehend all oak and hickory high
lands lying below Snow Hill and the fork of Broad and Saluda
rivers, Grave's Ford on the Wateree, and the new boundary line
on Pedee, and not included in the description or limits of the
two preceding classes, numbers 4 and 5, which shall be rated at
three dollars per acre.
1974]
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Class No. 7 shall include all pine barren lands not included
in classes Nos. 1, 4 and 5, which shall be rated at twenty cents
per acre.
Class No. 8 shall comprehend all oak and hickory high
lands lying above Snow Hill, the fork of Broad and Saluda riv-
ers, and Graves's Ford on the Wateree, the first quality of which
shall be rated at one dollar and fifty cents per acre; the second
quality at one dollar per acre; and the third quality at forty
cents per acre.
Class No. 9 shall comprehend all oak and hickory high
lands above the old Indian boundary line, the first quality of
which shall be rated at one dollar and twenty cents per acre; the
second quality at sixty cents per acre; and the third quality at
twenty cents per acre.
Class No. 10 shall include all lands within the parishes of
St. Philip's and St. Michael's, which shall be assessed in the
same manner and upon the same principles as houses and lots
in Charleston, and in a relative proportion to lands in the coun-
try.
42
The classification system originated by the 1784 act and con-
tinued in the 1815 act reflected market values, or at least relative
market values, current at the time.43 However, the system became
42. No. 2709, [1815] 6 S.C. Stat. 7. One of the reasons the "low country" was willing
to accept the classification system with with its lands bearing the greatest burden was in
part the result of a constitutional amendment adopted, and known as the "compromise
of 1808." It was ratified December 17, 1808, and was the first amendment to the 1790
constitution. In relevant part it reads:
In assigning representatives to the several districts of this State, the legislature
shall allow one representative for every sixty-second part of the whole number
of white inhabitants in the State and one representative also for every sixty-
second part of the whole taxes raised by the legislature of the State.
The Senate shall be composed of one member from each election district, as now
established for the election of members of the House of Representatives, except
the district formed by the parishes of St. Philip and St. Michael [Charleston],
to which shall be allowed two senators as heretofore.
I S.C. Stat. 194-95 (1836). Thus representation was decided on the basis of two factors,
people and property. The population factor favored the "up-country." For example, a
census in 1790 showed the "upper division" contained 111,534 whites while the "lower
division" contained 28,644. The taxes paid factor favored the "low country" which in 1790
paid £28,081 while the upper division paid only,£8,390. The city of Charleston alone paid
£10,761. For a general discussion of the above see 2 D. WALLACE, supra note 11, at 360-75
and 3 D. WALLAcE at 136.
43. See SoUTH CAROLINA, TmE GRAND TouR 21 (T. D. Clark ed. 1973) where John
Drayton (Governor of South Carolina at the time) wrote in 1802:
The best lands in this state, which are tide swamps, if cultivated, have sold for
one hundred and seventy dollars an acre. In general, however, they sell from
seventy to ninety dollars an acre; on a credit of one or two years. Uncultivated
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss3/7
1974] PROPERTY TAX 409
inaccurate with changing economic conditions, particularly with
the development of the up-country and the decline of the rice
industry."4 By 1843, the changed conditions caused the supreme
court to comment: "The system of taxation in South Carolina is
extremely arbitrary, and in many respects, unequal. The classifi-
cation of lands do not indicate their real value."
4 5
Two solutions were available: (1) the classification system
could be updated and refined or (2) the classification system
could be eliminated.
III.
THE 1865 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
On June 30, 1865, President Andrew Johnson appointed Ben-
jamin F. Perry as Provisional Governor for the State of South
Carolina." In July of that year Perry had a series of conversations
with the President during which Johnson indicated his policy for
the removal of military rule .4 A Constitutional Convention was
to be held which would repeal the Ordinance of Secession and
abolish slavery. 48 In addition, the popular election of Governor
and President was to be provided for.49 Johnson was unhappy
with the 1808 compromise which based representation in the
House of Representatives partly on the amount of taxes paid
rather than on a strict population basis. He was, however, per-
suaded to permit its continuation.0 Consequently, representation
tide land sells proportionably lower. Inland swamps, if cultivated, sell at prices
betwixt twenty and fifty dollars each acre. Good cotton land, has sold in Beau-
ford district, as high as sixty dollars per acre. In general, however, its value, in
different parts of the state, is from six to forty dollars; the same depending much
on its situation; as that nearest the sea, is considered the most valuable, and
produces the finest cotton. Other high lands, sell from one to six dollars an acre;
according to their respective situation, and convenience to navigation.
44. See 1 D. WALLACE at 381-83 and 3 D. WALLACE at 232 and 397.
45. Martin v. Tax Collector of St. Luke's Parish, 1 Speers 343, 344 (S.C. 1843).
46. 3 D. WALLACE at 237.
47. B.F. PERRY, REMINISCENCES OF PUBLIC MEN WITH SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES 245-49
(1889) [hereinafter cited as B. F. PERRY].
48. Id. at 245.
49. Id. at 247. Perry later addressed the 1865 Convention as follows:
It is very desirable that you should avail yourselves of the present opportunity
of reforming and popularizing the State Constitution in several particulars. It
is the reproach of South Carolina abroad that her Constitution is less popular
and republican in its provisions than that of any other State in the Union.
JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION 12 (1865) [hereinafter cited as 1865 CONVENTION].
50. B. F. PERRY, at 246. This part of the 1808 compromise was continued in the new
constitution as art. 1, § 5. Johnson further suggested that the parish system, which had
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to the 1865 Convention was on the same basis that had existed
in 1861.
On July 20, 1865, Perry issued a proclamation declaring in
force the laws which had existed prior to the war and calling for
the election of delegates to a Constitutional Convention on the
first Monday of September, the Convention to meet on Septem-
ber 13. 5'
The Convention met on that date at the Baptist Church in
Columbia.2 On September 14, 1865, the Convention received a
message from the Provisional Governor reading in part as follows:
You have been convened in obedience to the proclamation of his
Excellency Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, for
the purpose of organizing a State Government, "whereby justice
may be established, domestic tranquility insured, and loyal citi-
zens protected in all their rights of life, liberty and property." 3
The Convention met for only two weeks and made few changes
in the old constitution other than those agreed to at the Perry-
determined Senate seats, should be ignored in the election of delegates to the convention.
Id. Perry replied:
I had, all my life, been opposed to this Parish system of electing members of
the Legislature, on the ground that there was no justice or political equality in
a small Parish, with twenty or thirty voters, having the same voice and represen-
tation in legislation with a large District which polled five or six thousand votes,
and had ten times the property of the Parish. It was the rotten Borough system
of England, which had, at length been abolished in that Kingdom. When the
Parish system was adopted in South Carolina, and the rotten Borough system
in England, it may have been a fair representation of the two countries. But the
condition of both had since changed. Wealth and population had increased most
astonishingly in one section of the country, and diminished in another. The
lower country of South Carolina had declined since the adoption of the Parish
system, and the upper part of the State had prospered and quadrupled her
population and wealth. I said if I left the Parish system for the convention to
abolish it would give very little dissatisfaction, but if I ignored it in calling a
convention, it would produce a very unpleasant excitement.
Id at 247.
The 1865 constitution did abolish the parish system. Art. I, §§ 3 and 11. All election
districts were to have one Senate seat except Charleston which was granted two. Art. I, §
11. However, under the parish system Charleston had held ten seats. 3 D. WALLACE at
238.
51. F. SIMKINS & R. WOODY, SouTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCON 34-35 (1932).
Perry had already asked Johnson if the new constitution would have to be submitted to
Congress for its approval. Perry reported the President's response as follows: "He replied
that it would not, and expressed a wish that I would use all diligence in having the State
reconstructed, and members of Congress elected to take their seats as soon as that body
assembled." B. F. PERRY, supra note 96 at 247. However, in December 1865, Congress
refused to seat the State's elected Representatives and Senators. Id. at 55.
52. 1865 CONVENTION at 30.
53. Id. at 11.
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Johnson talks. The major substantive accomplishment was aboli-
tion of the classification system and the adoption of the actual
value standard.
On September 15, Mr. Charles Macbeth of Charleston intro-
duced a resolution reading as follows: "Resolved, That the Con-
stitution of this State shall be amended, so that all taxes hereaf-
ter levied shall be levied on the actual value of the property." 4
The resolution was referred to the Committee on Amendments to
the Constitution." After several unsuccessful efforts by Macbeth
to bring the matter to the floor,56 it became part of the report of
the Committee on Amendments to the Constitution which was
adopted on September 25.57
Article I, section 8, as adopted and ratified by the Conven-
tion, provided:
SECTION 8: All taxes upon property, real or personal, shall be
laid upon the actual value of the property taxed, as the same
shall be ascertained by an assessment made for the purpose of
laying such tax. In the first apportionment which shall be made
under this Constitution, the amount of taxes shall be estimated
from the average of the two years next preceding such appor-
tionment; but in every subsequent apportionment, from the
average of the ten years then next preceding.5
The background of the 1865 provision is discussed by Wallace as
follows:
But there had arisen an injustice to the low country in the sys-
tem of taxation, of which she now complained, as the back coun-
try had complained when the legislature of planters and
Charleston merchants, had before 1784, taxed every acre of land
in the province or State the same amount. But now the values
of classes of lands, fixed in 1784 from twenty-six dollars down
to twenty cents an acre, and made permanent in 1815, worked
similar injustice to the low country, whose lands had not in-
creased in value in proportion to those of the more rapidly grow-
ing up country.59
In a similar vein Wallace summarizes the background and
purpose of the new provision as follows:
54. Id. at 37.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 53 and 87.
57. Id. at 105 and 112.
58. Id. at 140.
59. 2 D. WALLACE 481.
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By up country development, the fixed classification of lands
adopted in 1784 to correct the former injustice of taxing all lands
at the same value had now come to work an injustice to the low
country, where values had lagged. Therefore, it was enacted that
all property should be assessed at its real value."
Contemporaneous accounts, particularly thosd from the low
country, were highly critical of the classification system. On Sep-
tember 19, shortly after the 1865 Convention met, the Charleston
Daily Courier published an editorial pointing out to the Conven-
tion the inequities of the existing tax system:
The present mode of taxation on lands is according to an artifi-
cial valuation, made in 1815, and introduced by the late Mr.
Blanding. It was a compromise proposed with the up country by
which, in consideration of the representation remaining with the
Parishes, the low country was practically to bear the burdens of
taxation. The lands of the State were, therefore, estimated at
prices ranging from 20 cents to $26 an acre, being in many
instances not one tenth part, at present rates, of their market-
able worth, while on the lots and buildings in the city of Charles-
ton the imposts were levied at full value. It thus happens that
the proprietors of a small house and lot here will pay more
revenue to the Government, and a larger tax, than the owner of
one of the finest and richest plantations in the State. The result
is as we have heretofore shown, that Charleston alone paid more
taxes on the lots and buildings within her corporate limits than
the whole of the upper division of the State on all its lands. The
condition of things which exist now are entirely different from
when this arrangement was made, and the reasons for its insti-
tution, if they were valid, have long since ceased to have any
weight. Now that the Constitution is to be changed, all needful
reforms should be made. No argument can be adduced why
lands in the country worth, in some instances forty dollars per
acre, should pay, on a valuation fixed in 1815, at four dollars per
acre, while lands and lots in the cities should be assessed at their
market price. The only true and equitable principle is for all
property to be taxed according to its bona fide worth. This prop-
osition is so plain and so consonant with the very elements of
justice and equity that the only surprise is that there should be
the slightest objection to it. Any other plan would be partial and
unequal, and without any foundation in right. 1
60. rd. at 238. See also J. WOLFE, SOUTH CAROLINA CONVENTION OF 1865, SOUTH CARO-
LINA HISTORICAL AsSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 18 (1942).
61. Charleston Daily Courier, Sept. 19, 1869, at 2. The editorial directly links the 1808
compromise on representation with the classification system of taxation. It states that the
[Vol. 26
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The solution, then, was that suggested by Governor Glen in
1751, that property be taxed according to actual value.
There are two elements to any property tax system: (1) the
rate of tax and (2) the valuation. Article I, section 8 of the 1865
Constitution prohibited the old statutory valuation by classes.
Section 8 mandated that all taxes upon property "be laid upon
the actual value of the property taxed." But while section 8 pro-
vided for the actual value standard, it did not expressly require
that an equal and uniform rate of tax be applied against it. The
question consequently arises as to whether the constitution, at
this point, would have permitted classification by the use of dif-
ferent rates, e.g., a tax of $1.00 on every $100 of actual value for
rice land, a tax of $.50 on every $100 of actual value for town lots
and a tax of $.10 on every $100 of actual value for pine barrens.
Quite plainly, the intent of the 1865 change was not to permit
such classification, but did a technical flaw exist? Following the
1865 amendment the state legislature established a clear one-
class system for real property. The last taxing act during the war,
Act No. 4699 of December 23, 1864, had provided for a tax of:
Six dollars ad valorem on every hundred dollars of the value of
all lands granted in this State, according to the existing classifi-
cation, as heretofore established; One dollar and fifty cents ad
valorem on every hundred dollars of the value of all lots, lands
and buildings within any city, town, village or borough of this
State.1
2
In December of 1865, the first taxing act after the 1865
amendment, put its terms into effect as follows: "Fifteen cents
ad valorem on every hundred dollars of the value of all the lands
granted in this State . . . and on all lots, lands and buildings
within any city, town, village or borough in this State." 3 The
following year this language was further simplified to read: "On
all real estate, thirty cents on every hundred dollars .. ."I, A
consistent pattern is therefore apparent: the existing classifica-
essence of the old compromise was that the low country received more than its fair share
of representation and paid more than its fair share of taxes. But President Johnson's
insistence on the abolition of the parish system, as well as the fact that Negroes were no
longer to be considered as property, assured that Charleston's pre-war dominance of the
state was ended. Understandably then, Charleston saw no point in continuing to pay more
taxes than the value of its property demanded.
62. No. 4699, [1864] 13 S.C. Stat. 195, 196.
63. No. 4728, [1865] 13 S.C. Stat. 236.
64. No. 4776, [1866] 13 S.C. Stat. 366.
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tion system of real property was considered unfair, the 1865 Con-
vention acted to abolish it, and the legislature subsequently
treated real property as one class for tax purposes. 5
The history with respect to personal property is also of inter-
est. Section 8 of the 1865 Constitution provided that all "taxes
upon property, real or personal, shall be laid upon the actual
value of the property taxed." It might be reasonably argued that
this language established two classes of property, real and per-
sonal, which could be treated differently. This, in fact, was the
view of the legislature in 1866. This legislature, as noted above,
taxed "all real estate" at 30 cents for each $100 of value. With
respect to personal property, however, an entirely different ap-
proach was taken. It was not only treated as a separate class but
was further subclassified. The actual value standard as mandated
by the 1865 amendment was applied, but classification was
achieved by use of different tax rates. Thus, the personal property
classes were:
I. Capital stock of $.50 per $100
gas-light companies of value
II. Manufactured articles $1.00 per $100
III. Liquor $10.00 per $10066
IV. Buggies, carriages, gold
and silver plate, watches,
jewelry and pianos $1.00 per $100
V. All other personal Not mentioned and
property presumably exempt.
The validity of this personal property classification may be ques-
tioned. Section 8 prescribes the same limitation for personal
property as it does for real property. However, the legislature
clearly thought it had the power to act as it did and there is no
reported case involving a challenge to the statute. Any question
was removed, however, by the 1868 constitution which corrected
65. Over a hundred years later, the Holzwasser court upheld the classification of real
property stating: "We find nothing in our Constitution that prohibits the General Assem-
bly of this State from classifying property according to its use so long as such classification
is reasonable." 205 S.E.2d at 704.
66. The tax on liquor was in the nature of a sales tax, being imposed upon the gross
amount of liquor sold during the year. No. 4776, [1866] 13 S.C. Stat. 366.
67. Id. No statutes were enacted in 1867. The 1866 Act was continued in effect by
General Order 139 of the military government. General Orders, No. 139, [18671 14 S.C.
Stat. 160. The only reported case involving the statute concerned the exemption provided
for the Freedman's Bureau. See Martin v. The City Council of Charleston, 13 Rich. Eq.
50 (S.C. 1866).
[Vol. 26
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss3/7
PROPERTY TAX
the drafting flaw of the 1865 constitution by prohibiting classifi-
cation by the use of different rates. Article IX, section 1 of the
1868 constitution provided: "The General Assembly shall provide
by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxa-
tion . ... 1
In summary, the 1865 provision established a single standard
for valuation, that standard being actual value. Thus, classifica-
tion by the use of different valuation standards was prohibited.
The 1868 constitution added the idea that the rate of tax must
be "uniform and equal." Thus, classification by the use of differ-
ent tax rates was prohibited.
IV.
THE 1868 CONSTITUTION
The state's next constitution, the Reconstruction Constitu-
tion of 1868, was drafted by a Convention meeting in Charleston
between January 14 and March 17, 1868.69 The Convention per-
fected and substantially elaborated the constitutional limitations
dealing with taxation. Its provisions included:
(1) Article I, section 36.
All property subject to taxation shall be taxed in propor-
tion to its value. Each individual of society has a right to
be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property,
according to standing laws. He should, therefore, contrib-
ute his share to the expense of his protection and give his
personal service when necessary."
(2) Article II, section 33.
All taxes upon property, real or personal, shall be laid upon
the actual value of the property taxed, as the same shall
be ascertained by an assessment made for the purpose of
laying such tax."
68. This provision is art. X, § 1 of the present constitution.
69. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1868)
[hereinafter cited as 1868 CONVENTION].
70. This provision was new with the 1868 constitution; it became art. I, § 6 of the
1895 constitution and later art. X, § 3A, No. 276, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2316. Its
history in the 1868 CONVENTION is as follows: Reported and first reading, 1868 CONVENTION
at 255, 258; second reading, Id. at 353; third reading, Id. at 788, 792.
71. This provision is identical with the first sentence of art. I, § 8 of the 1865 constitu-
tion. It became art. III, § 29 of the 1895 constitution. The history of the provision in the
1868 convention is as follows: Reported and first reading, 1868 CONVENTION at 310, 315;
second reading, Id. at 510-511; third reading, Id. at 842, 846.
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(3) Article IX, section 1.
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall pre-
scribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for
taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory, ex-
cept mines and mining claims, the proceeds of which alone
shall be taxed; and also excepting such property as may be
exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, sci-
entific, religious or charitable purposes. 2
(4) Article IX, section 6.
The General Assembly shall provide for the valuation and
assessment of all lands and improvements thereon prior to
the assembling of the General Assembly of one thousand
eight hundred and seventy, and thereafter on every fifth
year.3
(5) Article IX, section 8.
The corporate authorities of Counties, Townships, School
Districts, Cities, Towns and Villages may be vested with
power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes;
such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property
within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. And
the General Assembly shall require that all the property,
except that heretofore exempted within the limits of mu-
nicipal corporations, shall be taxed for the payment of
debts contracted under authority of law.74
The constitution was adopted as a whole by the Convention on
March 17, 1868,11 and ratified by popular vote in April.
76
72. This provision, as previously noted, corrected the drafting flaw in the 1865
amendment by requiring a "uniform and equal rate" of tax. It became art. X, § 1 of the
1895 constitution. This section also corrected another oversight in the 1865 constitution.
The 1865 constitution adopted the one class system but neglected to provide express
exemptions for public, religious and charitable property. This section authorized such
exemptions. Of course, if Holzwasser is correct, no express exemption is necessary; the
legislature may create reasonable classes, which these would seem to be. The history of
the provision in the 1868 convention is as follows: Reported, 1868 CoNVENm1ON at 362;
second reading, Id. at 656; third reading, Id. at 865.
73. This provision was derived from the second sentence of art. I, § 8 of the 1865
constitution. It became, with modifications, art. X, § 13 of the 1895 constitution. The
history of the provision in the 1868 convention is as follows: Reported, 1868 CONVNTION
at 362; second reading, Id. at 656; third reading, Id. at 865-66.
74. This provision was new with the 1868 constitution; it became art. X, § 5(1) of
the 1895 constitution. The history of the provision in the 1868 CONVENTION is as follows:
Reported, 1868 CONVENTION at 362-63; second reading, Id. at 658; third reading, Id. at 865-
66.
75. 1868 CONVENTION at 923. Interestingly, on January 29, 1868, the convention
adopted an ordinance imposing a highly classified special tax to raise money to meet the
[Vol. 26
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The Convention considered and rejected one proposal which
would have had a far reaching effect on the state's taxing system.
Mr. Parker proposed that the legislature be restrained from im-
posing any tax other than a property tax. His resolution providing
for an exclusive property tax read in part: "That all taxes on
property in this State, shall be assessed in exact proportion to the
value of such property . . . and that no other tax shall be im-
posed upon the people of this State."77 This resolution was re-
ferred to the Executive Committee but not reported out.7" A su-
preme court decision in 1873 was required to determine whether
the legislature could impose other taxes in addition to the prop-
erty tax.
79
On September 17, 1868, five months after the ratification of
the new constitution, the legislature enacted a comprehensive
forty-page statute providing for the assessment and taxation of
property.80 The statute, in conformity with the constitution, was
premised upon an unclassified tax on all real and personal prop-
erty. It defined the taxable base as "all real and personal" prop-
erty in the state; required that such property be valued at "actual
value;" and mandated that all property be taxed at the same
rate.
Section 1 described taxable property as follows:
That all real and personal property in this State, and personal
property of residents of this State, which may be kept or used
temporarily out of the State, with the intention of bringing the
expenses of the Convention. This tax was imposed as follows: (1) on all real estate -7.5
cents per $100 of value, (2) on manufactured articles - 15 cents per $100, (3) on buggies,
carriages, gold and silver plate, watches, jewelry, and pianos - 50 cents per $100, and (4)
a sales tax of 15 cents per $100. 1868 CoNVa1roN at 186. It is clear that this special tax
could not have been imposed after the Convention completed its work.
76. 3 D. WALLACE, at 257. The constitution included two other new tax provisions
which became the subject of litigation in State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873). Art. IX, § 3,
provided:
The General Assembly shall provide for an annual tax sufficient to defray the
estimated expenses of the State of each year; and whenever it shall happen that
such ordinary expenses of the State for any year shall exceed the income of the
State for such year, the General Assembly shall provide for levying a tax for the
ensuing year sufficient, with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency of
the preceding year, together with the estimated expenses of the ensuing year.
Art. IX, § 4, provided:
No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of a law which shall distinctly state
the object of the same; to which object such tax shall be applied.
77. 1868 CoWvarE N at 69.
78. Id. The resolution may have been the original source of art. I, § 36 of the 1868
constitution.
79. State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873).
80. No. 22, [1868] 14 S.C. Stat. 37.
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same into the State, or which has been sent out of the State for
sale and not yet sold; all moneys, credits, investments in bonds,
stocks, joint stock companies, or otherwise, of parties resident
in this State, shall be subject to taxation."1
Section 48 further defined the constitutional standard of
"actual value" as follows:
All real and personal property shall be valued for taxation at its
true value in money, which, in all cases not otherwise specially
provided for in this Act, shall be held to be the usual selling
price of similar property at the place where the return is to be
made; and if there be no usual selling price, then, at what is
honestly believed could be obtained for the same at a fair sale
at the place aforesaid; but each parcel of real property shall be
separately appraised without reference to the value of any grow-
ing crops thereon.2
Section 76 provides that real and personal property shall be
taxed at the same rate. It provides:
Each County Auditor, after receiving from the Auditor of the
State, and from such other officers and authorities as shall be
legally empowered to determine the rates or amount of taxes to
be levied for the various purposes authorized by law, statements
of the rates and sums to be levied for the current year, shall
forthwith proceed to determine the sums to be levied upon each
tract and lot of real property, adding the taxes of any previous
year that may have been omitted, and upon the amount of
personal property, moneys and credits listed in his County, in
the name of each person, company or corporation, which shall
be assessed equally on all real and personal property subject to
such taxes, and set down in one or more columns, in such man-
ner and form as the Auditor of the State shall prescribe.,
The state appropriation act for the year commencing Octo-
ber 1868, specified various appropriations for the executive, judi-
ciary, state police, education department, etc.84 The last section
of the act authorized the auditor to impose a "sufficient percen-
tum of taxes" to meet the authorized expenses "upon the assessed
valuations of the property of the State." Similarly, when the
81. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
84. No. 156, [1868] 14 S.C. Stat. 237.
85. Id. § 11, at 239. This section states:
The Auditor of the State is hereby authorized and directed to levy, and cause
[Vol. 26
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legislature authorized borrowing it provided for an unclassified
property tax sufficient to pay interest.8
The one-class property tax system adopted by the 1865 and
1868 constitutions and implemented by the legislature was con-
sistently followed for over a hundred years. The state imposed a
one-class tax to meet state expenses from 1868 to 1938, when the
state discontinued use of the property tax.8 From 1868 to 1972 the
to be collected, a sufficient percentum of taxes, to raise a necessary amount of
money, upon the assessed valuations of the property of the State, to meet the
appropriations enumerated in this Act: Provided, There shall not be assessed
and collected, under the provisions of this Act, an amount exceeding one million
dollars.
86. For example, No. 14 [1868] 14 S.C. Stat. 18 authorized the Governor to borrow
one million dollars to pay interest on the public debt. The last section provided:
SECTION 6. That an annual tax, in addition to all other taxes shall be levied
upon the property of the State, sufficient to pay the interest on the loan herein-
above authorized, at the times when such interest shall fall due.
87. The annual state property tax was unclassified from 1869 until its demise in 1938.
For example, No. 651 [1910] 31 S.C. Stat. 1161 provides:
[Tihere shall be levied upon all the taxable property in the state a sufficient
number of mills, not to exceed twelve and one-half, to be determined by the
Comptroller General from the assessment of the property therein, together with
all other income or revenue of the State, to raise the sum herein appropri-
ated. ...
The following chart lists the acts imposing the annual state property tax from 1869 to 1938:
No. 156. [1869] 14 S.C. Stat. 237.
No. 200, [1869] 14 S.C. Stat. 310.
Jt. Res. No. 2, [1870] 14 S.C. Stat. 699.
No. 219, [1872] 15 S.C. Stat. 306.
No. 424, [1873] 15 S.C. Stat. 515.
No. 514, [1874] 15 S.C. Stat. 609.
No. 710, [1875] 15 S.C. Stat. 884.
No. 9, [1875] 16 S.C. Stat. 9, as amended, No. 193, [1876] S.C.
Acts. & Jt. Res. 189.
No. 277, [1877] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 286.
No. 499, [1878] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 549.
No. 664, [1878] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 793.
No. 139, [1879] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 115.
No. 236, [1880], S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 272.
No. 321, [1880] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 380.
No. 694, [1882] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1064.
No. 115, [1882] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 184.
No. 333, [1883] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 502.
No. 576, [1884] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 933.
No. 144, [1885] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 258.
No. 342, [1886] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 635.
No. 433, [1887] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 870.
No. 16, [1889] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 32.
No. 197, [1889] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 321.
No. 444, [1890] S.C. acts & Jt. Res. 663.
No. 696, [1891] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1071.
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state also adhered to a one-class system in authorizing or impos-
ing taxes to meet county expenses."8
No. 24, [1892] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 32.
No. 314, [1893] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 450.
No. 528, [1894] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 758.
No. 125, [1896] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 278.
No. 341, [1897] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 543.
No. 525, [1898] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 823.
No. 93, [1899] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 138.
No. 264, [1900] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 461.
No. 442, [1901] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 756.
No. 604, [1902] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1107.
No. 90, [1903] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 133.
No. 299, [1904] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 533.
No. 499, [1905] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 973.
No. 99, [1906] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res 177.
No. 316, [1907] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 665.
No. 559, [1908] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1213.
No. 139, [1909] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 263.
No. 434, [1910] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 837.
No. 148, [1911] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 263.
No. 499, [1912] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 968.
No. 147, [1913] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 256.
No. 445, [1914] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 820.
No. 165, [1915] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 341.
No. 561, [1916] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1035.
No. 203, [1917] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 500.
No. 520, [1918] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1000.
No. 187, [1919] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 296.
No. 651, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1161.
No. 207, [1921] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 357.
No. 591, [1922] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1055.
No. 162, [1923] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 241.
No. 736, [1924] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1225.
No. 197, [1925] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 299.
No. 603, [1926] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1059.
No. 212, [1927] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 381.
No. 712, [1928] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1325.
No. 250, [1929 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 287.
No. 846, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1411.
No. 291, [1931] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 397.
No. 897, [1932] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1567.
No. 420, [1933] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 595.
No. 972, [1934] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1633.
No. 347, [1935] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 505.
No. 985, [1936] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1795.
No. 383, [1937] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 629.
No. 972, [1938] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1939.
88. In 1972 the legislature enacted No. 1266, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2467, which
directed the Tax Commission to apply a 9.5% assessment ratio (see text accompanying
note 326 infra) on manufacturer's property. This statute led to the Holzwasser litigation.
The state, in imposing taxes to meet county expenses, has consistently levied an
unclassified property tax. For example, No. 659, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1211, pro-
vides: 24
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Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina: That a
tax of eleven (11) mills is hereby levied upon all taxable property in the county
of Berkeley for county purposes for the fiscal year beginning January 1, 1920.
The following chart traces the county supply bills for five counties at ten year intervals
from 1890 to the present:
Berkeley County
No. 197, [1889] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 321, 323.
No. 264, [1900] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 461, 463.
No. 433, [1910] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 797, 804.
No. 659, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1211.
No. 889, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1581.
No. 1080, [1940] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2185.
No. 1112, [1950] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2817.
No. 959, [1960] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2250.
No. 1347, [1970] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2873.
No. 581, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1050.
Chesterfield County
No. 197, [1889] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 321, 325.
No. 264, [1900] S. C. Apts & Jt. Res. 461, 468.
No. 433, [1910] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 797, 810.
No. 664, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1232.
No. 931, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1663, and
No. 932, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1669.
No. 1132, [1940] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2317.
No. 1158, [1950] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2921.
No. 983, [1960] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2336.
No. 643, [1969] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1180.
No. 619, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1159.
Lexington County
No. 197, [1889] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 321, 329.
No. 264, [1900] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 461, 475.
No. 433, [1910] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 797, 824.
No. 683, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1291.
No. 1042, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1890.
No. 1245, [1940] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2594.
No. 1279, [1950] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3263.
No. 1080, [1960] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2669.
No. 1460, [1970] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3201.
No. 800, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1572.
No. 1900, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3779.
Richland County
No. 197, [1889] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 321, 330.
No. 264, [1900] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 461, 478.
No. 433, [1910] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 797, 828.
No. 691, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1319.
No. 1092, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1989.
No. 1284, [1940] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2701.
No. 1351, [1950 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3421.
No. 1115, [1960] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2815.
In 1966, by No. 3, [1967] S.C. Acts 5, the General Assembly devolved to the Board
of Administrators of Richland County the power to make appropriations and levy taxes.
The Board of Administrators became the County Council by Act No. 33, [1969] S.C. Acts
34 with the power to levy taxes.
Spartanburg County
No. 197, [1889] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 321, 331.
No. 264, [1900] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 461, 478. 25
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V.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION: 1868-1895
The state's next constitutional convention did not meet until
1895. Between 1868 and 1895 a number of important tax cases
reached the supreme court for decision. A common thread that
runs through these cases is the argument by the state that the
challenged tax act did not impose a "property" tax which would
be subject to the severe constitutional limitations. Rather, ac-
cording to the state, the act imposed a "special assessment" or
an "excise" or "license" or "franchise" tax. The taxpayer, on the
other hand, argued that the tax in question was a "property" tax
and hence unconstitutional. Categorization of the tax conse-
quently was decisive, it being understood by all parties that a true
property tax is inflexible: that a " uniform and equal rate" must
be applied against the constitutionally defined class, i.e., the
actual value of property. A non-property tax would be upheld if
the tax were applied against some reasonable class as defined by
the legislature. With respect to a property tax, however, the con-
stitution had removed legislative discretion, and the class was
established by the constitution itself.
In August of 1873 the supreme court decided State v. Rail-
road Corporations.9 The statute in issue was enacted in 1872 and
entitled, "An Act To Provide For A General License Law."'" Sec-
tion 7 of this act required every railroad company or corporation
in the state to pay a lump sum based on the length of its track
and provided for seven classes.' The court held this classified tax
to be unconstitutional. It categorized the tax as one on property
and held that the constitution prohibited "the levy of any tax on
No. 433, [1910] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 797, 830.
No. 693, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1327.
No. 1115, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2034.
No. 1299, [1940] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2746.
No. 1375, [1950] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3488.
No. 1131, [1960] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2876.
By No. 1035, [19681 S.C. Acts 2455 a county commission form of government was
created for Spartanburg County and it was given the power to levy taxes. Id. at 2458.
89. 4 S.C. 376 (1873).
90. No. 155, [1872] 15 S.C. Stat. 195. This act was approved on March 13, 1872. On
December 20, 1872, the act was repealed effective April 1, 1873. No. 221 [1872] 15 S.C.
Stat. 308.
91. 15 S.C. Stat. at 199. The seven classes provided for by the statute were (1) if a
company owned less than 50 miles it paid $187.50; (2) 50 to 75 miles - $375; (3) 75 to 100
miles - $625; (4) 100 to 150 miles - $875; (5) 150 to 200 miles - $1,000; (6) 200 to 250 miles
- $1,125; (7) and over 250 miles - $1,250.
[Vol. 26
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property except in proportion to value."92 The court noted: "It is
a tax imposed on the road as property. It is not laid on its income,
or any franchise or privilege, but measured solely by the 'length
of the -main track and branches.' -13 The court thought its conclu-
sion to be "so clear and undeniable that we shall content our-
selves with a mere reference to the clauses of the constitution
which forbid the levy of any tax on property except in proportion
to its value."94 The clauses cited by the court were article I, sec-
tion 36 (all property to be taxed "in proportion to its value");
article I, section 33 (original 1865 actual value standard); article
IX, section 1 ("uniform and equal rate" of taxation); and article
IX, section 6 (legislature to provide for valuation of all lands).
Consequently, in the first state tax case under the 1868 constitu-
tion, the court rejected a classified property tax on the ground
that it was not based on the constitutionally created class, i.e.,
the actual value of all property.
Also in August of 1873 the court decided three other cases
challenging the 1872 license law. All three held in favor of the
taxpayers on technical grounds, 5 but in the third, State v.
Hayne, the court went on to render an elaborate opinion because
of the "public importance" of the issue. The central issue pre-
sented to the court was whether or not the legistature could im-
pose any tax except a property tax. This issue was controlling
since the court and the parties agreed that the tax in question
could not be sustained if it were characterized as a property tax. 7
Section 10 of the 1872 license law required a payment of ten
dollars from every person engaged in the profession or calling of
attorney, physician, dentist, insurance agent or architect.
92. 4 S.C. at 377.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. State v. Chapeau & Heffron, 4 S.C. 378 (1873); State v. Graham & Chapeau, 4
S.C. 380 (1873); and State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873).
96. 4 S.C. at 411.
97. The act itself did not describe the required payment as a "tax," apparently on
the theory that it might be upheld as a license "fee" where a tax would fail. The court,
however, considered it as "in the nature of a tax." Id. at 411.
98. No. 155, [1872] 15 S.C. Stat. at 200. This section also included an ungraduated
gross income tax as follows:
[E]very person holding any office whatsoever, either elected or appointed, all
officers of corporations and societies who receive a salary, shall be required to
pay into the Treasury of the County in which such persons reside, for use of the
State, on or before the first day of April, A.D. 1872, the sum of one dollar for
every one hundred dollars' salary receivable, or to be received, from such office.
1974]
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Hayne, a lawyer in Charleston, continued to practice law without
making the payment. He was indicted, found guilty and fined
twenty dollars. Hayne took the basic position that the detailed
constitutional provisions dealing with the property tax were ex-
haustive and, by fair implication, prohibited the imposition of
any other type of tax. The Court rejected this argument on the
grounds that the constitution did not expressly prohibit the use
of other taxes"' and that no implications should be read in limit-
ing such an essential government power. Justice Willard, writing
for the court, stated:
[W]e may safely affirm that when the constitution undertakes
to regulate the exercise of the taxing powers, by prescribing the
mode by which the revenues of the State shall be raised, in the
absence of a clear intent to exclude other modes of raising reve-
nue than that prescribed, such regulation must be construed,
while imposing a political duty on the legislature, as not circum-
scribing its constitutional functions, so as to exclude it from
authorizing a resort to such auxiliary means of raising reve-
nue., 00
The court supported its conclusion by noting that the "taxing
power must be regarded as the primary power of government."'' 1
99. As previously mentioned, the Parker resolution presented to the 1868 Convention
did contain an express prohibition, providing "that no other tax [than a property tax]
shall be imposed upon the people of this State." 1868 CONvMiMON at 69. The Hayne court
did not refer to this history.
100. 4 S.C. at 413.
101. 4 S.C. at 412. More fully, the court stated:
The taxing power must be regarded as the primary power of government, as the
maintenance of peace is its primary duty. This results from the fact that its end
is the acquisition of means upon which the exercise of all the powers of the
government practically depend. It is indispensable, because the validity of the
government depends upon it. The inexorable necessity that is laid upon it is to
get adequate revenue. Subject to its fitness to attain this end, it should be so
shaped in its exercise as to distribute fairly the burden imposed on all that
should contribute.
Id. at 412-13.
Later in the opinion Justice Willard re-emphasized this point in the following manner:
There are but two modes in which government can secure the means of main-
taining itself in efficiency. One is by arbitrary seizure, taking, when and where
it can most conveniently be found, that which may be deemed necessary to
enable the government to perform its functions; the other is by systematic
proceedings for the purpose of raising money, having regard to the principle that
the burdens of supporting the government should be distributed fairly according
to some equitable rule of contribution. That sovereign States will and must
resort to extraordinary means of self-preservation in exigencies of peril, is settled
by the experience and common judgment of all mankind. Any attempt in a
28
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A limitation on such a power would have to be unmistakable. The
court's determination that the constitution permitted taxes in
addition to the property tax made further analysis necessary,"'2
the essential question becoming whether any constitutional limits
applied to a non-property tax. The court first reviewed the re-
straints on property taxes. It discussed article II, section 33, the
original actual value provision which provided that "all taxes
upon property, real or personal, shall be laid upon the actual
value of the property taxes," and noted:
There is no special grant of authority to levy taxes contained in
this Article. The right to levy taxes is conferred under the grant
of general legislative power. Section 33 assumes the existence of
such power, and undertakes to prescribe the rule of its exercise
where such exercise consists in the imposition of a tax of a
particular description, namely, taxes upon property, real and
personal.'13
The court then analyzed the issue of whether any constitutional
limits applied to a non-property tax. The actual value standard
of section 33 was inapplicable since it specifically referred to
property taxes. The court concluded that the first clause of article
IX, section 1, requiring a "uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation," governed a non-property tax. This conclusion led
to a curious situation and the court's reasoning is consequently
given at some length:
Section 1, apart from its provisions in regard to exemptions,
advances two ideas; first, equity in all taxation and assessment,
and second, valuation, as the means of securing such equality,
in the case of taxes on property. The first clause, namely, "the
General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal
written Constitution to restrain the possible exercise of such power in emergen-
cies would not conform to the nature of government or the views that mankind
entertain of duty in cases of extraordinary peril, and would be likely to be
disregarded in such cases.
Id. at 415-16.
102. Plainly, had this decision gone differently and confined the legislature to a
property tax, the challenged act would have been invalid. The tax was levied at a flat rate
on certain people. It did not even purport to reach the constitutionally defined property
tax class, i.e., the actual value of all property. Of course, if Holzwasser is correct, it is
immaterial whether or not the tax is a property tax; the only question is whether the
legislature has created a reasonable class. Obviously, the Hayne court was not of this view.
103. 4 S.C. at 421. The court observed that if the framers intended the property tax
to be exclusive they would probably have drafted section 33 as follows: "All taxes shall
be laid upon property, real and personal, according to the actual value of the property
taxed. . . ." Id.
1974]
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rate of assessment and taxation," is not, by its terms, applicable
alone as peculiar to taxes on property. It does not use the word
value, which is significant of taxation as applied to property.
That expression occurs in the second clause in connection with
the subject to which it belongs, namely, taxation of property.
These clauses are connected by the conjunction "and"; accord-
ingly their grammatical relations admit of their bearing inde-
pendent force and effect, if the nature of the subject-matter
admits of it. It is clear that the first clause, establishing the rule
of equality, must be regarded as affecting the poll tax, author-
ized by the second Section. The maximum of that tax is fixed
at one dollar per poll, but there is nothing in the last named
Section, standing by itself, that makes it necessary that all polls
should be considered equally in regard to that tax. The first
clause of Section 1 supplies this deficiency, and, we must con-
clude, was intended to supply it. It therefore follows that the
first clause prescribing uniformity was intended to have and has
an operation beyond the scope of the second clause, to the ex-
tent, at least, of regulating one form of tax not embraced in the
second clause, namely, the poll tax, to which the principle of
valuation is inapplicable. If, then, the first clause is not confined
to its operation to the class of taxes mentioned in the second
clause, as calling for valuation, it may be affirmed that the
object and intent of the first clause was to introduce the princi-
ple of equality and uniformity into any and all classes of taxes
that might be authorized by the Legislature, and that it was not
intended as a means of ascertaining what taxes might and what
might not be levied.'0 '
The court's opinion that a non-property tax must be equal and
uniform resulted in a return to what is called here the technical
flaw of 1865. But the flaw was reversed in its new version. The
1865 constitution had established a class, the actual value of
property. This defined the subject matter of the tax and the
method of valuing it. That constitution, however, failed to specify
that an equal rate be applied against the class. It was conse-
quently at least theoretically possible that classification could be
accomplished by the use of differing rates.' 5 This flaw was cured
104. Id. at 423-24. Strangely, many modem cases do not seem aware of this Hayne
position. Both Gregg Dyeing Company v. Query, 166 S.C. 117, 133, 164 S.E. 588, 594
(1931), afl'd, 286 U.S. 472 (1931) and State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66
S.E.2d 33 (1951) seem based on the idea that the uniform and equal test is applicable only
to a property tax, not an excise.
105. See text accompanying note 66 supra. This actually occurred with respect to
personal property. It is likely that a similar effort to classify real property would have
failed in view of the clear intent of the 1865 convention to end such classification.
[Vol. 26
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by article IX, section 1 of the 1868 constitution with its require-
ment of a "uniform and equal rate" of tax. Taken together, the
1865 and 1868 provisions form a clear patterfA, i.e., the class is the
value of property and the tax rate on all property must be equaL
They seem clearly designed to operate together, but either provi-
sion by itself lacks half of the equation and results in uncertainty.
Between 1865 and 1868 substantial questions existed as to the
effect of the actual value class. Similar questions existed as to the
effect of the equality and uniformity provision alone after the
Hayne court separated it from a property tax context. The diffi-
culty is that a requirement of a "uniform and equal rate" of
taxation assumes that a relevant class will be supplied from an-
other source.
With a property tax the constitution defines the class as the
actual value of all property, but what is the class in the case of a
non-property tax? Is the legislature free to determine what the
class will be? The answer must be yes. The only limit on the
legislative power would seem to be the equal protection clause' 6
or a similar kind of thinking which could be read into the phrase
"uniform." Essentially, personal discrimination is prohibited but
the legislature is otherwise free to classify. This will become clear
in the discussion below of State v. City of Columbia,"7 decided a
year after Hayne. Consequently, Holzwasser, in its view that the
equal protection clause is the only limit on the state's taxing
power, is correct in the case of a non-property tax.
The Hayne court, in its analysis of the second clause of arti-
cle IX, section 1, (the legislature "shall prescribe such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real,
personal . . ."), gave a clear expression of the one-class rule:
[Tihe second [clause] admits of no construction that can con-
fer on it an import beyond that plainly signified by the terms
employed, namely, that it should be the duty of the Legislature
to provide the means of securing equal and just valuation on all
property subject to taxation, the 36th Section of Article I, [all
property to be taxed "in proportion to its value"] and the 33d
Section of Article II, [original 1865 actual value standard] hav-
ing already fixed upon the value as the means of distributing the
106. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. It is reported that "[r]atification was probably
completed on July 9, 1868 when the legislature of the twenty-eighth state (South Carolina
or Louisiana) approved the amendment ... " THE CONSTrrTUION OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1952).
107. 6 S.C. 1 (1874).
19741
31
Quirk and Watkins: A Constitutional History of the Property Tax in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
burden that ought to be borne by property on all property that
should contribute to bear it.' °8
The court concluded that it found "no ground in the Constitution
for exclusing the Legislature from resorting to a tax on occupa-
tion."'
It the constitution permits non-property taxes the question
arises as to what kind of taxes will be included in that category.
Hayne involved an occupation tax."' An occupation tax is a type
of excise tax. Judge Cooley's classic definition of excises is: "taxes
levied upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodi-
ties within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupa-
tions, and upon corporate privileges.""' An excise tax is imposed
upon a transaction (sale, gift or death) or an activity such as
engaging in business. In contrast, a property tax is imposed sim-
ply on ownership. The proper characterization of the income tax,
as an excise or a property tax, was to become a subject of great
controversey later in the nineteenth century."
2
Shortly after Hayne the court was called upon to rule on a
City of Columbia ordinance imposing a license fee on various
occupations. The state had specifically authorized the city to
impose such fees by an 1871 statute."13 The city ordinance varied
the fee depending on the occupation: it required an annual pay-
ment of $100 for astrologers, $25 for lawyers, $200 for banks and
108. 4 S.C. at 424. The last phrase, "on all property that should contribute to bear
it," is a reference to the fact that art. IX, § 1 specifically exempts property used for
"municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." The 1868
constitution contains an express exception for such property which would otherwise have
come within the one-class rule.
109. Id. at 428.
110. Hayne made reference to another non-property tax, the poll or capitation tax.
Article IX, § 2 of the 1868 constitution provided: "The General Assembly may provide
annually for a poll tax, not to exceed one dollar on each poll, which shall be applied
exclusively to the public school fund."
111. 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTrruoNAL LimrrATIONS 928 (8th ed. 1927). Cooley also used
the following definition;
[A]n excise tax, using the term in its broad meaning as opposed to a property
tax, includes taxes sometimes designated by statute or referred to as privilege
taxes, license taxes, occupation taxes and business taxes.
1 T. COOLEY, THE LAW oF TAXATION § 45 (4th ed. 1924).
112. See text accompanying note 125 infra. The 1895 Convention specifically added
a provision to the constitution permitting a graduated income tax. S.C. CONST. art. X, §
1 (1895).
113. No. 343, [1871] 14 S.C. Stat. 569. The same statute authorized the city to
impose an unclassified property tax. Section 4 provided: "that all persons liable to taxa-
tion shall make discovery, upon oath or affirmation, of their taxable property within the
said City of Columbia, and make payment of their taxes. . . ." Id. at 570.
[Vol. 26
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bankers; and for billiard halls, $50 for the first table and $25 for
each additional table. Some eighty additional occupations were
further specified and the amount fixed for each class. Retail
stores were classified by the amount of annual sales. This ordi-
nance was challenged by several banks in State v. City of
Columbia.14 Justice Willard again wrote the opinion for the
court.
The taxing power was delegated to the city pursuant to arti-
cle IX, section 8 of the 1868 constitution which provided:
The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school dis-
tricts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to
assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be
uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdic-
tion of the body imposing the same."'
The language "uniform in respect to persons and property" is
different from the language of article IX, section one, "a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation," but the court's inter-
pretation of "uniform" under section 8 is a strong indication of
its interpretation of "uniform" under section 1. What type of
statute will be offensive to this constitutional limitation?
The banks argued that the charge imposed was improper
since they were authorized to engage in business by legislative
charter and had paid the state license fee under the controversial
1872 license law. The court traced the history of license fees which
were traditionally based on the police power rather than the tax-
ing power, and on the idea that certain businesses such as places
of public entertainment "should contribute specially to the sup-
port of the government in excess of the burdens borne by the
productive industries.""" It noted that the extension of license
fees beyond those occupations properly within the police power,
where circumstances of a peculiar nature rendered it requisite
that each particular avocation should have its own rate of taxa-
tion, was natural where taxation had divided itself into two
methods, the one embracing those subjects of taxation that are
capable of being reached by means of an uniform rate, and the
other such as could be treated in no other way than by subdivi-
sion into distinct classes and imposing a separate rate on each
of such classes.17
114. 6 S.C. 1 (1874).
115. This provision is presently found in art. X, § 5.
116. 6 S.C. at 6.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court thus took the view that there are two methods of taxa-
tion. The first method dealt with "those subjects of taxation that
are capable of being reached by means of a uniform rate." ' This
category, which would include a property tax, was not classifia-
ble. The second method of taxation dealt ivith subjects which
"could be treated in no other way than by subdivision into dis-
tinct classes and imposing a separate rate on each of such
classes.""' This category, which would include license taxes, re-
quired classification.
Despite its historical discussion of license fees as related to
the police power, the court held the challenged ordinance to be
an exercise of the taxing power. The constitution required that
delegated taxes be "uniform in respect of persons and property."
The court, following Hayne, thought it clear that the limitations
applied to "all kinds and modes of taxation."'' 2 The court noted
that the legislature had power
to authorize the imposition of a tax on avocations and business
by a municipal corporation, and to confer on such bodies power
to fix a separate rate for each distinct class of the subjects of
taxation embraced within it, unless the language of the consti-
tution, quoted above, is to be construed as rendering it impera-
tive that a single rate should be applied to all such subjects of
taxation equally.'
2'
Or, put differently, reasonable classification was permissible un-
less the uniformity requirement was construed as creating a single
class containing all "subjects of taxation." The court concluded
that the uniformity provision was not to be so construed. It was
evidently aware that the only constitutionally mandated single
class was property. What, then, did the uniformity provision re-
quire? The court's response was to use the language of equal
protection: "The true operation and effect, therefore, of the
[uniformity] provision under examination is to prevent discrimi-
nation among individuals liable to taxation on personal grounds
... " To the same effect, the court spoke of "improper dis-
crimination" as follows:
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 8. The court noted: "If equality and uniformity as the rule of taxation are
desirable in the case of a poll tax, or a tax on property as such, it is equally desirable that
it should apply to taxation on avocations and business." Id.
121. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
122. Id, at 8.
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[A]n improper discrimination as it regards the persons upon
whom the tax is imposed, is one that does not arise from the
nature of the subject matter in respect of which he is taxed but
from something that characterizes the individual as such, apart
from all consideration of the nature and situation of the thing
in respect of which the taxation is imposed.ln
The court found no improper discrimination or personal distinc-
tions in the highly classified ordinance. In sum, the result of the
Columbia case seems to be that when the 1868 uniformity provi-
sion is separated from the 1865 actual value for property stand-
ard, the legislature is free to classify limited only by equal protec-
tion considerations.
The billiard hall tax presented a separate question. This tax,
$50 for the first table and $25 for each additional table, looked a
great deal like a property tax. The court was clear that if the
billiard hall tax were a property tax, it would have to be stricken
since it was not based on actual value. The court concluded that
the tax was not a property tax. Instead, the number of tables was
simply used as a measure of the business done. The court noted:
"The number of billiard tables employed is not an improper mea-
sure of this amount and value of this business done, and it cannot
be regarded as virtually a tax on the tables considered as prop-
erty."'
After Hayne and Columbia what kind of non-property tax
was permissible? Obviously a flat amount on various occupa-
tions, differing widely from occupation to occupation, was per-
mitted. Also, quite clearly, a fixed percentage could be applied
against total sales or gross business income. But a percentage
varying with the amount of sales or income, increasing as sales
or income increased, raised more difficult questions. The rate, in
this situation, was not the same on all sales or income. Did it lack
uniformity? Certainly doubts existed as to the validity of a gradu-
ated income tax. This is clear since the 1895 Convention expressly
added an exception authorizing such a tax. Article X, section 1
of the 1895 constitution included the following: "[P]rovided,
further, That the General Assembly may provide for a graduated
123. Id. at 9. Perhaps the draftsmen of the 1868 uniformity provision had in mind
the English practice of grossly discriminatory laws. In 1691, the English imposed an
income tax "which taxed Protestants at a certain rate, Catholics, as a class, at double the
rate of Protestants, and Jews at another and separate rate." Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596, (1895), rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (concurring opinion
of Justice Field).
124. Id. at 10.
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tax on incomes, and for a graduated license on occupations and
business."'' 5 Also, academic discussion has to some extent cen-
tered upon the issue of "uniformity." For example, one recent
study states: "A graduated income tax by its very nature lacks
the uniformity of taxation typically required by the state consti-
tutional restrictions." ' 6 But, in the authors' view, uniformity was
not the problem: the problem was the proper characterization of
the income tax - Was it a property or non-property tax? If an
excise, the tax would simply be tested against uniformity, but, as
interpreted by Columbia, uniformity would seem to bar a gradu-
ated tax. It is not based on "improper discrimination" or "per-
sonal" distinctions. Further, it does not seem unreasonable, in an
equal protection sense, to classify income depending on the
amount received during a particular period. To apply one rate to
the first $10,000 of income and a higher rate to the fifth or sixth
$10,000 received does not seem arbitrary. Consequently, an in-
come tax, if considered as an excise, would appear valid under the
1868 constitution.
But if the income tax is properly categorized as a property
tax it must fail. It must fail because it is not based on the actual
value of property as mandated by the constitution. Income de-
rived from capital or property might be a relevant factor in deter-
mining value, but it would not be decisive. An income tax on
income derived purely from labor seems clearly to be an excise
rather than a property tax. The license tax cases discussed above
indicate that such a levy would be upheld. A graduated income
tax, however, limited solely to the income of labor, appears logi-
cally and politically unpalatable.
During this period (1868-1895) several license tax cases arose
which resulted in reaffirming the principles of Hayne and
Columbia."' In 1878 the legislature created the office of Railroad
125. Article X of the 1895 constitution was derived from art. IX of the 1868 constitu-
tion.
126. J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 39 (1969).
127. (1) In Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S.C. 47 (1881), the General Assembly had passed
an act titled "An Act to Regulate the Assessment and Taxation of Personal Property in
the City of Charleston." No. 293, [1870] 14 S.C. Stat. 408. Article U1, § 20 of the 1868
constitution required that "[E]very Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate
to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Section 7 of the act authorized
the city council of Charleston to impose a license tax. The court held the act unconstitu-
tional because a license tax was not a tax on personal property and therefore the act
related to a subject not. expressed in its title. (2) Information against Oliver, 21 S.C. 318
(1844), held that a new act, No. 462, [1881] 17 S.C. Stat. 582, passed to allow Charles-
ton's city council to impose a license law, corrected the earlier defect and was constitu-
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Commissioner with certain regulatory powers over railroads doing
business in the state.12 This act was later included in a general
railroad law which provided that the expenses of the Commis-
sioner and his office were to be borne by the railroads "according
to their gross income" 129 The statute did not characterize the
railroads' payment as a tax, as a fee, or otherwise. In the first
challenge to the acts, Columbia & Greenville R.R. v. Gibbes,3'
the majority of the supreme court stated that "in the view which
the court takes it will not be necessary to determine the precise
character of the exaction assailed."' 3' This issue was avoided by
an unusual interpretation of the nature of a corporate charter.
According to the court, since the 1879 Railroad Commission Act
preceded the plaintiff's charter, granted in 1880, it thereby "ac-
cepted the charter in full view of a public act of which all are
bound to take notice, and it thereby became a condition of the
charter."'32 Mr. Justice McIver, who served as Chief Justice from
1891 to 1903, dissented but stated that the "pressure of other
official duties" prevented him from writing an opinion at the
time. 3
3
The next challenge to the act involved a railroad which had
been chartered prior to 1879.31 The court's contract theory would
apparently not hold. The railroad argued that the payment was
in substance a property tax and invalid because not imposed on
actual value and not imposed on all property. 35 Again, however,
the court submerged the basic issue presented to it. This was
accomplished by unusual interpretations of the nature of corpora-
tions and the state constitution's anti-Dartmouth College provi-
sion. Corporations, as viewed by the court, are creatures of gov-
ernment and have "life, if life at all as a matter of grace and may
tional. (3) Information against Jager, 29 S.C. 438 (1888), reaffirmed the State v. Hayne
series of cases to the effect that the General Assembly can give a city council the power
to raise revenue by means of a license tax.
128. No. 662, [1878] 16 S.C. Stat. 789, repealed and re-enacted, No. 595, [1882] 17
S.C. Stat. 791.
129. 17 S.C. at 817. More fully, § 41 directed the Comptroller General to "assess upon
each of said corporations its just proportion of such expenses, in proportion to its said gross
income for the current year. . . ." Id. The payment was to be collected "in the manner
provided by law for the collection of taxes." Id.
130. 24 S.C. 60 (1885).
131. Id. at 72.
132. Id. at 73.
133. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
134. Charlotte, Col. & Aug. R.R. v. Gibbes, 27 S.C. 385 (1887).
135. Id. at 390.
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demand nothing."'36 The court's theory of the anti-Dartmouth
College provision was equally unusual.' 31 Such provisions were
added to most state constitutions in the years following Justice
Marshall's opinion.'- Their intent was to prevent a corporation
from securing a vested right from one legislature which would be
beyond the power of a subsequent legislature. The provision is
normally viewed as reserving to the legislature powers which it
otherwise possesses. The South Carolina court, however, viewed
it as a separate grant of power. It returned to a contract theory
by the following unusual path: The railroad accepted its charter
with knowledge of the reserved power and therefore it waived the
constitution and consented to any future amendment the legisla-
ture might make as a matter of contract. It stated:
[I]t can make no difference what it may be called-whether a
tax for revenue, a police regulation, or license fee. Whatever it
may be, the company contracted to pay it; and if it claims the
privileges and rights of its charter it must take them with the
burdens. 3'
The court seemed to be going to extreme lengths to avoid the
critical questions posed: What is the nature of the payment, and
if it is a property tax, must it not fall? No doubt sensitive to this
possible criticism, the court, in the last two paragraphs of its
opinion, comes to the point. The tax is not a property tax. It is a
license tax. It is "uniform" because it is imposed upon a reason-
able class, all railroads.
Justice McIver again dissented but now wrote a substantial
and thoughtful opinion. McIver disagreed with the majority's
novel theories and its conclusion. The exaction was not "within
the limitations of the taxing power as prescribed by the constitu-
tion."4 0
136. Id. at 395. The court continued on this theme:
It is emphatically clay in the hands of the potter, and must take its life at the
will of the government, or not at all. "Hath not the potter power over the clay?"
Besides it can protect itself if it sees proper by simply refusing to enter into the
contract proposed, or, if after having once accepted, by throwing up its charter
if the subsequent burden imposed proves too onerous.
Id.
137. This provision originated in the 1868 constitution which read: "[Corporations
may be formed under general laws; but all such laws may from time to time be altered or
repealed." Art. XII, § 1.
138. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The
decision was based on the impairment of contract clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
139. 27 S.C. at 393.
140. Id. at 398.
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The majority's "clay in the potter's hands""'' theory was re-
jected by McIver, who considered it "singular" that such a doc-
trine had not even been advanced previously.' Corporations
were entitled to the protections of the constitution. He also re-
jected the majority's expansive interpretation of the anti-
Dartmouth College provision. It was not a waiver of constitu-
tional guarantees and consent to any amendment the legialature
might want to make. The provision simply reserved to the legisla-
ture the power to make such laws "as it could make within the
limitations prescribed by the constitution."'' The corporation
could not assume "that the legislature would violate the law of
its existence, and undertake to do that which the people, in their
sovereign capacity, had forbidden them from doing."'4 What had
the people forbidden the legislature from doing? They had pro-
hibited the imposition of a property tax which was not based on
actual value.' And they had prohibited the taxation of property
at an unequal rate.'
Before reaching this conclusion, McIver first analyzed the
nature of the tax. Was it a license tax as the majority had found?
A license tax is a tax on the privilege of exercising an avocation.4 '
McIver noted that the tax in question did not "even purport to
be a license tax" and had none of the "characteristics of such a
tax."'' A license tax necessarily involves the idea that if payment
is not made it will be unlawful to carry on the business. But
McIver saw nothing in the act to indicate that the legislature
intended to impose such a sanction. The Justice concluded that
the tax was not a license tax. However, assuming arguendo that
it was a license tax, McIver had substantial doubts as to its
validity. If it were a license tax it would, after Hayne, be required
to meet the constitution's article IX, section one test of "uni-
form." As was seen in Columbia, this test requires a reasonable
class in an equal protection sense. McIver thought the statutory
class, railroads, to be dubious.
[Although] a tax on professions or occupations is not forbidden
by the constitution of the state, it does not by any means follow
141. See note 136 supra.
142. 27 S.C. at 399.
143. Id. at 407.
144. Id. at 408.
145. Id. at 403.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 401-02.
148. Id. at 402.
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that the legislature has the right to single out one particular
avocation, or rather, as in this case, one branch of an avocation.
For the avocation of the plaintiff company is that of a common
carrier, and the exaction is not required from all common car-
riers, leaving all other avocations and professions free from the
burden of such exactions.'
If the tax was to be considered a property tax, McIver believed it
"quite clear" that it would violate the constitution. 5 ' It was not
laid upon actual value and, as a double tax, would result in an
unequal rate of taxation. McIver wrote:
If, then, this exaction must be regarded as a tax upon the prop-
erty of the plaintiff corporation, then it is quite clear that it is
in violation of the provisions of the constitution for two reasons.
1st. Because it is not laid upon the value of the property, as
ascertained by an appraisement made for the purpose (State v.
Railroad Corporations, 4 S.C. 376)[article II, section 33] and
2nd. It would be a double tax on the same property; for it must
be assumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that
the officers charged with the duty of collecting the ordinary
taxes from this company have performed that duty, and hence
to require such company to pay this additional tax upon its
property would be so plainly in violation of the constitution as
to need no further remark.'5'
The Justice considered the tax to be a property tax since the
measure of the tax, gross income, "is manifestly due to the tangi-
ble property used in producing such income.'
'5 2
Justice McIver then discussed the argument that the tax was
not on the corporation's tangible property but on its franchises
and that the value of the franchises "is measured by the income
derived from the exercise of such franchises.'1 3 McIver saw no
reason why franchises, a form of intangible property, "may not
be taxed like all other property, provided their actual value has
been ascertained by an assessment made for that purpose, as
149. Id.
150. Id. at 403.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 404. McIver did not exclude the possibility that the tax might be consid-
ered an income tax rather than a property tax. He stated:
If it should be said that this is a tax upon the income of railroad corporations,
and not upon their property, either tangible or intangible, the proposition would
be met by the same objection of want of uniformity, inasmuch as no other
corporations or persons are subjected to such a tax.
Id. at 405.
153. Id. at 404.
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required by the constitution."''- Of course, no assessment of the
franchises had been made. Also, the act did not purport to impose
a franchise tax. Gross income was not a reascinable measure of the
value of the franchises since the income was produced by the
tangible property as well as the franchises, "for it is quite certain
that the franchises without the aid of the tangible property,
which has already been taxed, would yield no income."155
Finally, McIver concluded that even if he were wrong in all
his previous positions, the tax could not stand because the rate
of tax on the franchises did not comply with article IX's require-
ment of an equal rate of tax on all property. The rate of the tax
in question was determined by the expenses of the Railroad Com-
mission, not the rate applied to all other property. All property
was one class. McIver stated:
But even regarding this as a tax upon the franchises of this
corporation, as contra-distinguished from its tangible property,
and that the value of such franchises can be properly measured,
and were intended to be measured by the gross income of the
company, then it could only be required to pay the same rate of
taxation upon the value of such property as is imposed upon all
other property, and not a proportionate part of the expenses of
certain officers and agencies of the government."5 6
In sum, as a franchise tax, the tax violated both basic constitu-
tional limits on property taxation. It was not laid upon actual
value as determined by an assessment and would result in an
unequal rate of taxation. Justice McIver's later tax opinions will
be discussed below.
Article IX, section 8 of the 1868 constitution expressly author-
ized the legislature to delegate the taxing power to counties and
municipal corporations. It further required that such taxes be "uni-
form in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the
body imposing the same." The provision read:
The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school dis-
tricts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to
assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be
uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdic-
tion of the body imposing the same. And the General Assembly
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Also, uniformity would be violated because "all other corporations are not
taxed upon their franchises." Id. at 405.
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shall require that all the property except that heretofore ex-
empted within the limits of municipal corporations, shall be
taxed for the payment of debts contracted under authority of
law.1
57
This provision, taken in conjunction with article II, section
33 and article IX, section 1, would seem to require a one-class
system .18 However, it appears that, in fact, classification into two
classes, real property and personal property, existed between 1868
and 1895. An 1898 opinion by then Chief Justice McIver gives the
following background:
It is well known, as a matter of legislative history, that prior to
the passage of that [1897] act, some municipal corporations in
this State were only invested with the power to impose taxes
upon real property, while others were empowered to impose
taxes upon personal as well as real property, and the sole object
of that act was to bring about uniformity in the taxation of
property, as required by sec. 6 of art. VIII. of the present
Constitution [1895 version of article IX, section 8], and not to
deal in any respect with taxation imposed upon persons."'
No case has been found challenging the classification into real
and personal property referred to by McIver. Apparently, the
issue would revolve around the second sentence of section 8, part
of which is emphasized above. The second sentence, providing
that "all" property shall be taxed for the "payment of debts" may
contain a negative implication that all property need not be taxed
if the payment of debts was not involved, i.e., if the revenue was
to be raised for general corporate purposes. Chief Justice McIver
indicated this interpretation in an 1892 opinion: "It will be ob-
served that the language [of article IX, section 8] is not that all
property, except that previously exempted, shall be taxed, but
shall be taxed 'for the payment of debts.' ""0
157. S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (1868) (emphasis added).
158. This view is further supported by Act No. 295, [1870] 14 S.C. Stat. 410, which
provided:
That all municipal corporations created under or by the laws of this State, and
vested with power to lay and collect taxes, are hereby authorized and required
to assess all property, real and personal, within their corporate limits, at its
actual value, and lay all taxes thereon at a uniform and equal rate ...
This act was repealed in 1874. Its statutory history is given in Ross v. Kelly, 45 S.C. 457,
461, 23 S.E. 281, 282-83 (1895).
159. Florida Cent.,& P.R.R. v. City of Columbia, 54 S.C. 266, 278, 32 S.E. 408, 413
(1898) (emphasis in original).
160. State ex reL. Bartless v. Beaufort, 39 S.C. 5, 13, 17 S.E. 355, 358 (1892) (emphasis
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The meaning of the second sentence, and consequently all of
section 8, was therefore in some doubt during this period. The
1895 Convention acted to end any doubt. As noted above, it was
"well known" at the time of the Convention that the legislature
had authorized or permitted municipal corporations to divide
property into two classes - real and personal. The Convention
prohibited such classification in the future. The second sentence
of old section 8 was altered to read:
[A]nd the General Assembly shall require that all the property,
except that herein permitted to be exempted within the limits
of municipal corporations, shall be taxed for corporate purposes
and the payment of debts contracted under law. 6 '
The addition of the phrase "corporate purposes" made the sent-
ence co-extensive with the municipality's taxing power. It elimi-
nated the possibility of a negative implication which had existed
under the earlier language. In 1897, two years after the constitu-
tion was ratified, the legislature implemented the one-class rule
by statute.
1 2
The 1868 constitution authorized the legislature to delegate
the taxing power to certain governmental bodies. Article IX, sec-
tion 8, read in part: "The corporate authorities of counties, town-
ships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested
in original). The Chief Justice added his theory of the origin of the second sentence:
Now as municipal corporations usually have no means of raising money except
by taxation and as there might be danger that municipal corporations might
contract debts, and then attempt to evade the payment thereof by exempting
property from taxation (an apprehension which subsequent events has [sic]
fully justified), it may be and probably was, the object of this provision to
prevent the evasion, by requiring all property to be taxed for the payment of
debts, but not for any other purpose.
Id. at 13-14, 17 S.E. at 358.
The Beaufort case involved the legality of an ordinance granting a $100 property tax
exemption to household furniture. McIver ruled that the substantive question was not
properly before the court.
161. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5 (emphasis added).
162. No. 235, [1897] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 409. In its entirety, this act reads:
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South
Carolina, that from and after the passage of this Act all municipal taxes levied
by cities and towns in this State shall be levied on all property, real and per-
sonal, not exempt by law from taxation, situate within the limits of said cities
and towns, and in accordance with Section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution
of 1895.
SECTION 2. That the clauses of the charters of any towns or cities restricting
taxation in said towns to real estate only are hereby repealed.
SECTION 3. That all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are repealed.
43
Quirk and Watkins: A Constitutional History of the Property Tax in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes;
" and the meaning of the term "corporate purposes" was
litigated in several cases."6 3
163. Two cases which may be noted are Floyd v. Perrin, 30 S.C. 1, 8 S.E. 14 (1888)
and State ex rel. Dickinson v. Neely, 30 S.C. 587, 9 S.E. 664 (1889).
Floyd v. Perrin developed from an 1885 amendment to the charter of the Greenville
and Port Royal Railroad Company. No. 130 [1885] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 237, amending
No. 129, [1882] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 214. The 1882 act authorized cities, towns and
counties "interested in the construction of said road" to purchase the capital stock of the
railroad. The stock was to be paid for by exchanging the local government's bonds for the
stock. The railroad would then sell the bonds for cash. The local government would be
required to levy taxes to pay the interest and principal on its bonds. The hope, rarely
fulfilled, was that dividends on the railroad stock would be sufficient to meet debt service
on the bonds without resort to taxation. In 1885 the railroad charter was amended by the
legislature to add the following curious provision: that existing unincorporated towns
"along the line of said railroad, or which are interested in the construction as herein
provided for, shall be, and they are hereby declared to be, bodies politic and corporate,
and vested with the necessary powers to carry out the provisions of this act." No. 130,
[1885] S.C. Acts & Jt. Rs. at 240. The only evident "necessary" power to carry out the
purpose of the act was the issuance of town debt to pay for the railroad stock and the power
to levy taxes to pay for the debt. The freshly-created town of Ninety-Six issued debt and
purchased railroad stock. Subsequently, it levied taxes to meet the interest on the out-
standing bonds. Taxpayers then brought an action to recover taxes paid on the ground
that the state delegation of the taxing power did not comply with art. IX, § 8. The supreme
court agreed with the taxpayers. The opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Simpson, noted
that:
[Tihese incorporations are rather singular bodies. No machinery is provided
for their organization; they have no officials, no perpetual succession, nothing,
in fact, usually belonging and appertaining to corporate bodies, either public or
private, municipal or otherwise.
30 S.C. at 12, 8 S.E. at 17. The court felt obliged to accept the legislative declaration that
these entities were corporate bodies but considered what corporate purpose would be
served by the purchase of the stock. Indeed, no corporate purposes of any kind were
express. Counties, the court noted, may be authorized to purchase railroad stock because
of their jurisdiction over highways, bridges and ferries. But this was not the case with a
township, much less a township with no express purposes. The court held that the dis-
puted provisions were in violation of the art. IX, § 8 requirement that the delegated taxing
power must serve a corporate purpose. In a concurring opinion, Justice McIver wrote of
the nature of the delegated power as follows:
The people in their sovereign capacity have, by their constitution, entrusted the
taxing power to the general assembly, and, upon a familiar principle, this power
thus delegated to that body cannot be delegated by it to any subordinate agency,
except by express permission of the sovereign authority. The framers of the
constitution, recognizing this doctrine, provided that this high power of taxation
might be delegated to certain subordinate agencies for certain purposes, for we
find it declared in section 8 of article IX: "The corporate authorities of counties,
townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with power
to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes,&c." It is clear, therefore, that
this provision is, as is said by Waite, C.J., in Weightman v. Clark, 103 U.S. 259,
in speaking of a similar provision in the constitution of Illinois, "a limitation
on the power of the legislature to authorize taxation by public corporations."
Id. at 15, 8 S.E. at 18-19. Following the decision in Floyd v. Perrin the situation of those
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An additional problem which arose with respect to the dele-
gated taxing power was that of the multiple assessment. The 1868
constitution required that all taxes be laid upon actual value "as
the same shall be ascertained by an assessment made for the
purpose of laying such a tax."'164 Further, article IX, section one
directed the legislature to provide for a "uniform and equal rate
of assessment." However, the 1868 constitution contained no
express provision requiring all taxes, state, county, city, etc., to
be levied on the basis of one assessment. Such a provision was
added by the 1895 Convention. 16 5 The framers of the 1868 consti-
tution probably thought such a provision unnecessary since ac-
who had purchased the Ninety-Six bonds seemed perilous. The town had lost the power
to tax. The legislature, however, rushed to the rescue. Floyd v. Perrin was handed down
on November 30, 1888. One month later, on December 22, 1888, the legislature enacted a
statute to bail out the bondholders. No. 10, [1888] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 12. The new
statute declared the debt valid. Interest and principal was to be met "by the assessment,
levying and collection of an annual tax upon the taxable property in said townships." Id.
This act was upheld by the court in an opinion by Justice Mclver. State ex rel.
Dickinson v. Neely, 30 S.C. 587, 9 S.E. 664 (1889). The court took the view that here the
legislature was acting directly in imposing the tax rather than delegating the power. Floyd
v. Perrin "did not touch the question whether the legislature might not, by the exercise
of its own power, impose a tax for the same purpose for which it had, without constitu-
tional authority, attempted to delegate the power to certain townships." 30 S.C. at 603, 9
S.E. at 665 (emphasis in original). The court noted:
As we understand it, the legislature has been invested with unlimited power of
taxation, except as restrained by some constitutional provisions; and it has also
been authorized by section 8, article IX, to delegate this high power of taxation
to certain specified subordinate agencies, for certain specified purposes. It may,
then, be said that, in respect to taxation, the legislature has been invested with
two distinct classes of powers: one which it exercises at its own sovereign will;
the other which it delegates to some subordinate agency, to be exercised by such
agency at its will, within the prescribed limits. Now while there are limitations
to both of these classes of powers, the limitations are not the same. In the former
the only limitation is some constitutional provision, while in the latter there
may be, and usually are, additional limitations prescribed in the act delegating
the power. But the more material distinction between these two classes of pow-
ers is (so far as concerns the present discussion) that in the former the only
limitation imposed by the constitution, so far as the purpose for which the tax
is imposed is concerned, is that it shall be a public purpose, while in the latter
the limitation is that it shall also be for a corporate purpose.
Id. at 603, 9 S.E. at 665 (emphasis in original).
Granting that the state is here exercising "its own" power and that the state may tax
for any public purpose, the question remaining is whether the state can tax in this manner.
The tax in question was to be laid upon actual value so no problem existed under art. II,
§ 33. But what of the art. IX, § 1 requirement of a "uniform and equal" rate of assessment
and taxation? The tax was uniform and equal as to property within the township, which
is apparently the relevant class in the case of a state tax levied for the benefit of a county
or locality.
164. Art. II, § 33.
165. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 13 (1895). 45
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tual value was mandated and there can be only one actual value.
The case of Ross v. Kelly' 6 arose under the 1868 constitution.
The taxpayer, a resident of Charleston, alleged that in 1893 her
property had been assessed for state and county purposes at
$87,790 while the city had assessed it at $141,085 for municipal
purposes. The taxpayer argued that this was unconstitutional
since it was not uniform or based upon actual value. Obviously,
both assessments could not be a correct statement of actual
value. The court held for the taxpayer but based its decision on
narrow grounds. Article IX, section 8 provided that the corporate
authorities of the specified localities "may be vested with power
to assess and collect taxes." But the court found that Charleston
had not been so vested. Chief Justice Mclver, in a concurring
opinion, was willing to go much farther. He stated that:
[A]ny other conclusion would be subversive of the manifest
object of the Constitution to secure uniformity in the assessment
and taxation of all property. Section 33, of article I., expressly
provides that all taxes shall be laid upon the actual value of
such property as ascertained by an assessment made for that
purpose. Section 1, of article IX., provides that the General
Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation; and hence section 8 of that article,
permitting the General Assembly to vest in municipal corpora-
tions the power to assess and collect taxes for corporate pur-
poses, must be so construed as to conform to the manifest
scheme of uniformity expressly required by the previous provi-
sions of the Constitution."'
Two years later in State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Talley, 6' the
court rejected McIver's "manifest scheme" and upheld a multiple
assessment where the delegation of authority had been properly
made. The court, in an opinion by Justice Pope, upheld a sepa-
rate, and higher, assessment made by the city of Columbia on
certain railroad property. The majority did not meet, or even
recognize, the Chief Justice's argument. McIver dissented, stat-
ing that he was "entirely satisfied" that under the constitution
"there can be but one lawful assessment of property for taxa-
tion."'' 9 The court's decision may have been influenced by the
166. 45 S.C. 457, 23 S.E. 281 (1895).
167. Id. at 463, 23 S.E. at 283-84 (emphasis in original).
168. 50 S.C. 374, 27 S.E. 803 (1897).
169. Id. at 379, 27 S.E. at 805.
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fact that the 1895 constitution had already mooted the question
for future years.17 0
Another critical aspect of a one-class system, the power to
exempt, was scrutinized in the 1899 decision Garrison v. City of
Laurens."' The case involved the 1868 constitution although it
was decided after the constitution had been replaced. The city of
Laurens, in 1893, adopted a resolution exempting from municipal
taxes for 12 years any cotton mills which would locate within the
city. The Laurens Cotton Mill compiled with the resolution. A
taxpayer brought an action against the city to require it to collect
taxes from the mill. Justice Pope, for the court, gave a clear
expression of the one-class rule as follows:
There was no power in the city council of Laurens, in the year
1893, to exempt, or to promise to exempt, factories from taxa-
tion upon their location in the city of Laurens. Such a step was
a palpable violation of the Constitution adopted in 1868-for
that instrument required all property, real and personal, to be
assessed for taxation.
172
The 1895 constitution authorized localities to exempt new manu-
facturing establishments but required a local referendum and
limited the exemption period to five years."'
The state's interesting approach to the problem of exempting
new industry, when that was prohibited by the constitution, arose
indirectly in Germania Savings Bank v. Town of Darlington.",
The opinion was written by Chief Justice McIver, but the three
other justices concurred in the result only. By an 1884 amend-
ment to the constitution, a new section 17 was added to article
IX. It read: "[A]ny bonded debt hereafter incurred by any
170. Art. X, § 13 of the 1895 constitution provided:
The General Assembly shall provide for the assessment of all property for taxa-
tion; and State, County, township, school, municipal and all other taxes shall
be levied on the same assessment which shall be that made for State taxes; and
the taxes for the sub-divisions of the State shall be levied and collected by the
respective fiscal authorities thereof.
See text accompanying note 260 infra.
171. 54 S.C. 449, 32 S.E. 696 (1899).
172. Id. at 455, 32 S.E. at 699.
173. S.C. CoNsT. art. VII, § 8 (1895). Justice Pope noted:
There never was any power in this State, after 1868, to release property from
taxation until the Constitution of 1895 gave cities and towns such power for the
limited period of five years and upon the matter being submitted to the voters
of such city or town for their approval.
54 S.C. at 456, 32 S.E. at 699.
174. 50 S.C. 337, 27 S.E. 846 (1897).
1974]
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County, municipal corporation, or political division of this State
shall never exceed eight per centum of the assessed value of all
the taxable property therein. '" 75 The town of Darlington, in 1890,
issued $73,000 of bonds in aid of the construction of a railroad." 6
The town refused to pay interest on the bonds when due on the
grounds that the bonds were "invalid, null and void" '77 because
the issuance violated the eight percent of assessed value limita-
tions. Again, a question of multiple assessment was presented.
For 1890, the assessment made of all taxable property in the town
for the purposes of state and county taxation amounted to
$831,265 (eight percent of which would be about $66,500).18 The
assessment made by the town assessors for the purposes of munic-
ipal taxation amounted to $1,019,685 (eight percent of which
would be about $81,575).111 The town took the position that the
state assessment must control and consequently the eight percent
limit was exceeded. Justice McIver, as noted above in the discus-
sions of Ross v. Kelly, agreed with the view that there could not
be two actual values. 8 ' He held the state assessment to be deci-
sive. Oddly, McIver makes no reference to Talley which held
multiple assessments permissible over his dissent. Justice Jones,
concurring, stated that Talley had already been decided although
the opinion was not yet filed.81 In any case, having found the
state assessment controlling, McIver concluded that the bonds
were issued without constitutional authority."2 It would conse-
175. S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 17 (1884).
176. The town agreed to convey to the railroad, upon completion of this work, town
bonds in the amount of $2,000 per mile of completed road. The $73,000 of bonds were
turned over to the railroad after the railroad commissioners certified that the roads were
completed. 50 S.C. at 339-40, 27 S.E. at 847. The town already had $3,000 of debt out-
standing. Id. at 342, 27 S.E. at 851.
177. Id., 27 S.E. at 850.
178. Id. at 363, 27 S.E. at 858.
179. Id.
180. See text accompanying note 167 infra. McIver, in referring to Ross v. Kelly,
stated that he did there
express the opinion, to which he still adheres, that, in accordance with the
manifest scheme of the Constitution to secure uniformity, as well in the assess-
ment as in the taxation of property, there could be but one lawful assessment
of property, whether for State, county or municipal purposes, which must repre-
sent the actual value of the property; for otherwise the same property might be
represented as having two actual values differing in amount-which, to use the
mildest term, would be anomalous, if not absurd.
Id. at 364, 27 S.E. at 858 (emphasis in original).
181. Id. at 369, 27 S.E. at 860.
182. Id. at 365, 27 S.E. at 858.
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quently appear that the bondholders were about to take a loss.
But McIver cited the maxim communis error facit jus (common
error makes law) as applicable since town assessments had been
widely used and sanctioned and the Kelly case, which would have
put a prudent person on notice, was not decided until 1895.10
The town, however, had one further argument. Even if this
maxim were applied and the town assessment used, the eight
percent limit was still violated since the property of the Darling-
ton Manufacturing Company should be deducted from the as-
sessed value total as exempt property because of Act No. 422 of
1873.184 This act, entitled an "Act to Aid and Encourage Manu-
facturers" stated its purpose as "inducing the investment and
employment of capital in the manufacture" of specified goods.,
Any individual or corporation investing his capital in such an
enterprise was "entitled to receive from the Treasury of the State,
annually, a sum equal to the aggregate of state taxes, less two
mills, to be used for school purposes.""1 6 A similar provision re-
quired payment to the manufacturers from the county and mu-
nicipal treasurers in an amount equal to taxes collected. ' The
act provided that it shall not be "so construed as to exempt from
taxation the land upon which said factories may be erected."''8
The benefits of the act terminated after ten years of business
operation.' 9 This statute is certainly curious, since a normal
means of accomplishing this end would be simply to exempt the
new investment from taxes in whole or in part, for the specified
period. The draftsmen of Act No. 422, however, were generally
careful in avoiding the straightforward language of tax exemp-
tion. Instead, a circular procedure was established with the com-
183. Concurring Justice Jones was highly critical of the use of the maxim. The Justice
said he would not "resort to the exceptional and dangerous doctrine of communis error
facit jus." Id. at 373, 27 S.E. at 861. He continued as follows:
I would not favor the application of the above rarely needed doctrine, which
makes error right because the error is common. Perhaps this exceptional doc-
trine may be properly applied to prevent wide-spread unsettling of real estate
titles, as in Herndon v. Moore, but I do not think this case calls for its applica-
tion. If the bonds are in excess of the constitutional limit, they are void, and
[are] beyond the curative power of legislature or court.
Id., 27 S.E. at 861-62.
184. No. 422, [1873] 15 S.C. Stat. 513.
185. The specified goods were "cotton, woolen and paper fabrics, iron, lime, and...
agricultural implements." Id. § 1.
186. Id.
187. Id. § 2.
188. Id. § 3.
189. Id. § 5.
1974]
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pany paying its taxes in full and then receiving from the treas-
urer the payment of a sum equal to the taxes paid.'90 Clearly, the
draftsmen did not believe a partial tax exemption statute for
manufacturers could be sustained.'9 ' The draftsmen, writing five
years after the 1868 constitution was ratified, would not have
agreed with the Holzwasser interpretation. According to
Holzwasser it would only be necessary to create a reasonable
class, which new business would seem to be, and tax all within
that class at a uniform rate."12 The draftsmen did not think that
such a simple route was available to them; they felt bound to
collect full taxes because the constitution established a one-class
system for all property except the specified classes which might
be exempted. Of course, the attempted avoidance of the constitu-
tional mandate by Act No. 422 is crude. There is no substantive
distinction between exemption and paying your taxes and then
receiving them back. But the draftsmen felt obliged to make the
effort and they apparently had a legal theory. The act is not a tax
exemption statute; instead it provides for a bonus paid by the
state for conduct it wishes to encourage.'93 McIver commented:
[Ihf the General Assembly had undertaken, in express terms,
to exempt the property of that company from taxation, the ef-
fect would have been futile, because in plain violation of the
provision of sec. 1 of art. 9, by which the General Assembly is
required to provide by law for the assessment and taxation "of
all property, real personal and possessory," except such classes
of property, specifically mentioned, as may be exempted by law
from taxation; and it certainly cannot be pretended that the
property of the Darlington Manufacturing Company falls within
any of those classes. But, in addition to this, the General Assem-
bly has not undertaken to exempt any of the property of the
company from taxation. . . .It is very manifest, therefore, that
the section necessarily contemplated that such property should
not only be assessed for taxation, but that taxes must be paid
thereon, for otherwise the scheme of the statute could not possi-
bly be carried out. The real and only purpose of this statutory
provision was to give a bonus to those who had invested their
190. Of course, the company did not receive from the treasurer taxes attributable to
land or the state two mill school tax.
191. The constitution authorized tax exemptions only for property used for "munici-
pal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." S.C. CONST. art IX,
§ 1 (1895); see also S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1895).
192. There seems no reason under Holzwasser why the uniform rate could not be zero.
193. The legality of the bonus was apparently not challenged.
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capital in manufacturing enterprises, for the purpose of encour-
aging such enterprises.'94
McIver, consequently, for purposes of the eight percent limit
found the property to be taxable and properly included in the
total assessed value. But it might be noted that he would have
reached the same conclusion had he found the statute invalid. No
case has been found on the point, but it might be questioned
whether Act No. 422 could have withstood a direct challenge.'95
The other three Justices, as noted above, concurred in the
result only. Justice Jones wrote a concurring opinion taking the
position that multiple assessments were permissible. The town
assessment was therefore valid and the bonds legal. Justice Pope,
based on his opinion in Talley, probably took the same view."6
194. 50 S.C. at 367-68, 27 S.E. at 589 (emphasis in original).
195. The act was repealed by No. 180, [1885] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 333. The repealer
preserved rights which had been acquired while No. 422, [1873] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 513
was in effect.
196. Two additional assessment cases arising under the 1868 constitution may be
briefly noted.
In Ex Parte Lynch, 16 S.C. 32 (1881), the court was required to interpret art. IX, § 6
of the constitution which provided:
The General Assembly shall provide for the valuation and assessment of all
lands and the improvements thereon, prior to the assembling of the General
Assembly of 1870, and thereafter on every fifth year.
The legislature provided for an assessment in 1875 and again in 1879. Lynch failed to file
a return required in connection with the 1879 assessment. As required by statute the
auditor added a 50 percent penalty because of the failure to file. As a result, $5,100 was
added to the normal assessed value of $10,200 giving a total value of $15,300. Lynch argued
(1) that the act calling for the 1879 assessment was invalid because not "on every fifth
year" as required by the constitution; and (2) the 50 percent penalty resulted in unequal
taxation. The court supported the early assessment interpreting the constitutional lan-
guage as mandating an assessment on every fifth year but permitting assessments at other
times. Of course, the essential constitutional objection of actual value is more accurately
achieved by more frequent assessments. Lynch's objection to the 50 percent penalty was
rejected by the court on the ground that it was a legitimate tax collection regulation. In
digcussing the uniformity clause the court again viewed this provision in equal protection
terms, noting that it "applies equally to all defaulters." Id. at 39.
In Chamberlin v. Walters, 60 F. 788 (C.C.D.S.C. 1894), the receiver of a railroad
asserted that its property for 1891 had been assessed at 80 percent of actual value while
other real and personal property in the state was "openly and notoriously assessed at 50
or 60 percent." Id. at 788, 793. The receiver maintained that that railroad had been denied
equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The federal court took the
position that it had limited power over the matter of state assessment of property. It could
not review the assessment simply on the grounds that it was excessive. It could intervene
if the system were designed to operate unequally, to put an undue burden of taxation on
railroads. The court began with a statement of the constitutional one-class system as
follows:
The general assembly of South Carolina are instructed by the constitution to
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A special assessment for local improvements presents a diffi-
cult characterization question. If it is considered a tax it must
conform to all constitutional limitations. It would necessarily
seem destined to fail since it is not "uniform in respect to persons
and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the
same."' D7 If an assessment be considered not a tax it would seem
to present no particular problem. Cooley reports that special as-
sessments are generally not regarded as taxes: "ordinarily special
assessments are not within the meaning of such words as used in
the constitutions .. ."I" However, in a series of cases the South
Carolina Supreme Court viewed assessments as taxes."'
Mr. Justice Pope struck down an assessment stating:
But, by the Constitutions of the years 1868 and 1895, very radi-
cal changes were made in the subject of taxation. It was no
longer left to the General Assembly or its municipalities to tax
as they pleased. All taxes were required to be levied according
to the value of the property real and personal. All persons and
property were required to be taxed uniformly. Whenever any
property was exempted from taxation, it was specifically named
in the Constitution itself. The assessments of the value of prop-
erty for taxation were required to be made in anticipation of the
laying of taxes. . . but it is enough for our purpose to say that
in our Constitution no power is given to the General Assembly
to carve the territory of the State into special tax districts for
prescribe such regulations as will secure a just valuation of all property under a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation.
Id. at 790. The court believed that it had been established, however, that "real and
personal property have been assessed for taxation below the real value in money." Id. at
792. It also seemed satisfied that railroad property was assessed more heavily than other
property. But it did not find the differential attributable to a design "to throw the burden
on the railroads." Id. at 793. Instead it noted the different methods of assessment used.
Generally, assessments were made by local officials who would be expected to undervalue.
As the court put it, "They have a direct personal interest in a low assessment, and their
environment induces them to make it. When men deal with the interest of the government
and of the citizen, all doubts are solved in favor of the citizen." Id. at 792. Railroads, on
the other hand, made return to the Comptroller General who was responsible for their
assessment. The court concluded that no malicious design had been shown and instructed
the receiver to pay the taxes.
Apparently, the receiver did not bring an action in the state courts.
197. S.C. CONST. art. IX, § 8. In addition, assessments are generally based on benefit
rather than value and would consequently also violate the actual value standard. See
Jackson v. Breeland, 103 S.C. 184, 88 S.E. 128 (1915).
198. 1 T. COOLEY, THE LAw OF TAXATION § 31 (4th ed. 1924).
199. Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 53 S.C. 285, 31 S.E. 252 (1898); Steh-
meyer v. City Council of Charleston, 53 S.C. 259, 31 S.E. 322 (1898); and Mauldin v. City
Council of Greenville, 42 S.C. 293, 20 S.E. 842 (1893).
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State taxation except into counties, townships, school districts,
cities, towns and villages .... Wherever there is a public or
corporate purpose, the whole property of the city, town or village
must be taxed to subserve such public or corporate purpose. ' ,,
Later cases have veered away from this characterization of special
assessments and the present law seems to consider an assessment
as not a tax.2° 1
VI.
THE 1895 CONVENTION
The Constitutional Convention of 1895 met in Columbia,
convening on September 10, and adjourning on December 4.211
Circumstances in the country had altered drastically since the
1868 Convention. For a basically agricultural society, a property
tax seems a fair and simple means of collecting revenue. But as
society became dissociated from the land by industrialization and
urbanization the property tax became less easy to apply and less
equitable."3 Government turned to an essentially untapped and
expanding source of revenue, personal and corporate income.
A second important change since the 1868 Convention was
the country's increasing experience with the federal equal protec-
tion clause as a limit on the power of state government .2 1 Only
200. Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 53 S.C. 285, 292-93, 31 S.E. 252, 254.
201. Jackson v. Breeland, 103 S.C. 184,88 S.E. 128 (1915); Distin v. Bolding, 240 S.C.
545, 126 S.E.2d 649 (1962); and Newton v. Hanlon, 248 S.C. 251, 149 S.E.2d 606 (1966).
Also, in Evans v. Beattie, 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E. 538 (1926), the court found, contrary
to Pope, that the legislature did have the power to create special taxing districts.
202. A journal was kept of the Convention's actions. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTrrUrONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1895 (Calvo 1895) [hereinafter cited as 1895
JOURNAL]. However, no transcript of the debates was maintained. On September 18, 1895
a resolution to engage a stenographer to transcribe the proceedings was tabled after the
following comments of Mr. W. D. Evans:
He facetiously remarked that there would be some of the members who would
much prefer after the convention was all over that no record of it had even been
kept. . . the newspapers and the journal will be depended upon for the records
of the convention.
The News and Courier, Sept. 19, 1895, at 1, col. 2. See also The State, Sept. 19, 1895, at
3, col. 1. The State newspaper of Columbia and The News and Courier of Charleston
reported the debates in substantial detail and reference will be made to these sources. It
will be noted that the reports are in the third person rather than direct quotes.
203. Conceivably the property tax could have been adjusted to the changed circum-
stances but the portable nature of the new wealth, i.e., intangibles such as money, stocks
and bonds, made this unlikely. The property tax is successful dealing with real property,
less sucessful dealing with personal property and probably not appropriate in dealing with
intangibles.
204. As noted above, the fourteenth amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868, after
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two years before the 1895 Convention met, the United States
Supreme Court had interpreted the equal protection clause with
respect to taxation, stating that it was not intended "to prevent
classification of property for taxation at different rates; or to pro-
hibit legislation in that regard. . . .It is enough that there is no
discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same
class." 5' It does not seem to have been suggested, either during
this period or later, that equal protection would prevent imposi-
tion of a graduated income tax. The classifications created by
such a tax appear reasonable in an equal protection sense.
A third major influence on the 1895 Convention was the legal
controversy surrounding the Federal Income Tax Act of 1894.051
This act, effective as of January 1, 1895, °1 was the first effort by
the federal government to impose an income tax since shortly
after the Civil War.00 For individuals the first $4,000 of income
was exempt; all income in excess was taxed at a flat two per-
cent.2"' Corporations paid a flat two percent rate on all in-
come." 0
The Constitution grants Congress the power to "collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises. . . but all duties, imposts and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."' ' The
Constitution requires that a direct tax be "apportioned among
the several states which may be included in this Union, according
to their respective numbers." ' In other words, if the federal gov-
the 1868 constitution had been adopted. Of cburse, its terms were known and ratification
expected as the 1868 Convention met.
205. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893). The quoted language may be com-
pared with the following essentially similar passage from Holzwasser:
We find nothing in our Constitution that prohibits the General Assembly of this
State from classifying property according to its use so long as such classification
is reasonable and not arbitrary, and the tax imposed is uniform on the same
class of property.
205 S.E.2d at 705.
206. Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
207. Id. at 553.
208. The last income tax act before that of 1894 was the Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255,
16 Stat. 256.
209. Id. at § 27, 28 Stat. 553.
210. Id. at § 32, 28 Stat. 556.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 which provides:
Congress shall have the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States.
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 which more fully provides:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
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ernment needed $20,000,000 in direct taxes, it was required to
divide that amount up among the various states according to the
population of each. The wealth of a state was irrelevant. If popu-
lation was in direct proportion to wealth this system was quite
workable. But this was not the case. Joseph H. Choate, in his
closing argument on behalf of the taxpayer in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. 13 provided some interesting figures. If the in-
come tax was valid, Choate argued, four states (New York, Penn-
sylvania, Massachusetts and New Jersey) would provide 90 per-
cent of total collections. 14 The same states had about 25 percent
of the population and representation."'5 A direct tax, on the other
hand, would be relatively light on the major four states and heavy
on the remaining states with 75 percent of the population but only
ten percent of the wealth. For this reason, the federal government
had imposed a direct property tax only in times of great stress.
Federal property taxes were imposed (1) in 1798 when a war with
France was thought imminent, (2) in 1813 and 1815 to meet ex-
penses attributable to the War of 1812, and (3) during the Civil
War." 6 Consequently, a direct tax, requiring apportionment ac-
cording to population, was not a practical or politically feasible
means of raising revenue. An excise tax, however, had only to be
"uniform." Is an income tax properly characterized as a direct tax
or an excise? This was the issue faced by the Supreme Court in
Pollock.1
17
The first decision focused on rental income derived from real
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Num-
bers .... U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9 provides in relevant part: No Capitation, or
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumera-
tion hereinbefore directed to be taken.
213. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
214. 157 U.S. at 532-33.
215. Id. at 533.
216. Id. at 572-73. For example, the direct tax of 1798 was designed to raise
$2,000,000. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597. Section one apportioned precise dollar
amounts to the various states; South Carolina's share was $112,997.73 and nine mills. Id.
at 598. Section two imposed a rate of tax against dwelling houses which rate was graduated
ranging from .2 percent on houses valued between $100 and $500 to 1.0 percent on houses
valued above $30,000. Id. The same section imposed a tax of $.50 on every slave. The
remainder of the state's share was to be raised by a tax on land "at such rate per centum
as will be sufficient to produce the said remainder." Id.
217. Choate made some argument that the act could not be sustained even if an
excise because of a lack of uniformity. He pointed to what he considered to be an irrational
exemption for certain savings banks and insurance companies as well as the basic $4,000
exemption. But the essential argument was as stated in the text-Is it a direct tax or an
excise?
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property. It was generally agreed that a tax on real property was
a direct tax. Was any distinction to be drawn between a tax on
the land itself and one on the income derived from it? The Court,
"unable to perceive any ground for the alleged distinction,""2 8
stated: "The name of the tax is unimportant. . . . It is the sub-
stance and not the form which controls .. ."", The two dissent-
ing Justices thought a valid distinction could be made.21 Conse-
quently, as far as rental income was concerned, the Court held
the income tax to be in substance and effect a property tax.
Initially, the Court evenly divided on the characterization of
an income tax on income from personal property. This placed in
doubt whether the act could validly reach all dividend and inter-
est income. On rehearing, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held the
tax on the income derived from personal property to be a direct
tax and invalid."' The income tax on labor (professions, trades,
employments) was sustained by the court as an excise. 22 How-
ever, it struck down the act as a whole, reasoning that Congress
would not have intended to tax labor if capital could not be
taxed.ss
The Pollock decisions were undoubtedly studied by the
members of the 1895 Convention who met in the fall of that year.
In a state context, the Pollock issue is not concerned with direct
taxes or apportionment. The issue is the proper characterization
218. 157 U.S. at 581.
219. Id. at 580-81.
220. Justice White noted:
It is said that a tax on the rentals is a tax on the land, as if the act here under
consideration imposed an immediate tax on the rentals. This statement, I sub-
mit, is a misconception of the issue. The point involved is whether a tax on net
income, when such income is made up by aggregating all sources of revenue and
deducting repairs, insurance, losses in business, exemptions, etc., becomes to
the extent to which real estate revenues may have entered into the gross income,
a direct tax on the land itself. In other words, does that which reaches an
income, and thereby reaches rentals indirectly, and reaches the land by a double
indirection, amount to direct levy on the land itself? It seems to me the question
when thus accurately stated furnishes its own negative response.
Id. at 645.
221. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
222. Id. at 635. The Court stated:
We have considered the act 'only in respect of the tax on income derived from
real estate, and from invested personal property, and have not commented on
so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employ-
ments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or
employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such.
Id, at 635.
223. Id. at 637.
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of an income tax:224 Is it a property tax or an excise? If a property
tax it would be subject to all the relevant constitutional limits.
If an excise, according to Hayne, it need only be equal and uni-
form. As a property tax, the income tax would surely fail since,
among other reasons, it is not based on the actual value of prop-
erty as ascertained by an assessment. 225 As an excise, it would
apparently succeed since classification is permitted and uniform-
ity is necessary only within the class. 22 The delegates to the Con-
vention had to consider it likely that the state supreme court
would follow the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court and char-
acterize the income tax as a property tax. The need for a specific
constitutional provision authorizing such a tax was consequently
224. The term "income tax" as used here means a tax on both capital and labor. The
distinction has been drawn above between the income tax on capital which the Court held
direct and the tax on labor which the Court sustained as an excise. Congress did not
reenact the 1894 act to apply only to labor, presumably on the grounds that such a tax
would be a political disaster. The same consideration would influence a state legislature.
To be practical, an income tax must reach both capital and labor.
225. Income might be a relevant factor in determining value but it would not be
decisive. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in striking down a state income tax, analyzed the
issue as follows:
As heretofore shown, the word "property" as used in our constitution includes
income, and income is "property." Therefore it necessarily follows that under
the constitution of this State all taxes must be levied on property by valuation,
so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the valua-
tion of his or its property. The 1932 Income Tax law is an attempt to levy a tax
upon property (income) by means of a graduated scale that increases in rate as
applied to increases from property and personal earnings. It therefore violates
the constitutional provision that all taxes must be levied on property according
to valuation.
Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, 595, 182 N.E. 909, 915 (1932).
226. The Georgia constitution provided that "all taxation shall be uniform upon the
same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property." In Featherstone v. Norman, 170
Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930) the Supreme Court of Georgia concludes that a "tax on income
is not a tax upon property." Id. at 65. With this premise established, the court then tested
the act against the uniformity clause. It held that the income tax act did not violate the
uniformity provision. The court noted:
By this provision [quoted above] the makers of the Constitution put property
in one class and clothed the Legislature with ample and full power to classify
the subjects of taxation other than property. The Legislature cannot classify
property and impose upon one species thereof a different tax from that imposed
on other species. Property subject to be taxed is treated as one single class, and
there can be levied but on rate on all species of it.
This act is not lacking in uniformity because it provides for a graduated tax
and makes certain exemptions from such tax. As we have seen, the Legislature
can classify the subjects of taxation other than property. It can likewise subclas-
sify them.
Id. at 65-66.
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clear to them.12 ' But if Holzwasser is correct this is a complete
misanalysis of the situation. At worst the income tax is a property
tax and, according to Holzwasser, a property tax can be classified
to the full extent of equal protection. Consequently, no special
provision authorizing an income tax would be needed; the legisla-
ture was already fully empowered. Further, if equal protection is
the only intended limit on the legislature's taxing power the con-
stitution could be substantially simplified by the deletion of all
the taxing restrictions. The fourteenth amendment would remain
to assure that "classification is reasonable and not arbitrary, and
the tax imposed is uniform on the same class of property.""
Plainly, the delegates did not view the issue this way.
On September 20, 1895, Mr. W. D. Evans, Chairman of the
Committee on Finance and Taxation reported on article IX of the
constitution.2  Section one of the proposed article was identical
to old section one of the 1868 constitution with the addition of two
proviso clauses.n° The first proviso clause authorized a capitation
tax on domestic animals. The second proviso simply stated:
"That the General Assembly may provide for a tax on in-
comes.Y)2 1 This provision came before the Convention for debate
on October 18, 1895.232
Immediately, Mr. George Johnstone of Newberry moved to
amend to add the language, "derived from investments that are
not liable to taxation. ' ' 23 The effect of this amendment would
have been drastic. Under it, the income from property which is
taxable - which is all property except certain exempt categories -
would be free of the income tax. The only remaining tax base is
income derived from exempt property. It is unrealistic to expect
that the income from exempt property, municipal, religious, edu-
227. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
228. Holzwasser v. Brady, 205 S.E.2d 701, 704 (S.C. 1974).
229. 1895 JOURNAL at 197.
230. Id. The proposed new material is italicized below:
Section 1. The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory,
except mines and mining claims, the proceeds of which alone shall be taxed; and
also exempting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educa-
tional, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes: Provided, however,
That the General Assembly may impose a capitation tax upon such domestic
animals as, from their nature and habits, are destructive of other property: And
provided, further, That the General Assembly may provide for a tax on incomes.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 359.
233. Id.
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cational and charitable, would ever in fact be taxed. The clear
purpose of the Johnstone amendment was to kill the income tax
provision. Mr. W. J. Talbert of Edgefield made this point stating
that it "would defeat the very object of an income tax."' 4 John-
stone replied that he only intended to avoid "double taxation."
His response is reported as follows:
He urged that it was only to avoid double taxation. As the
section now stood it would be likely to tax the agriculturist and
those investing in active enterprises far more than dear capital,
such as is invested in bonds exempted from taxation. In re-
sponse to Mr. Talbert's inquiry, he thought it better not to leave
the matter to the legislature. It was proper to lay down the
principles of taxation. It was wrong to double tax the farmer by
taxing his land and income or anyone in that class.25
Of course, any income tax would result in "double taxation" as
Johnstone used the term. Mr. W. D. Evans, Chairman of the
Committee on Finance and Taxation, moved to table the amend-
ment.23 The Evans motion was passed by a vote of 63 to 34.237
The 34 votes against tabling indicate that a substantial minority
of the Convention was opposed to the income tax.
The opponents of the tax next proposed a specific exemption
for agricultural income. Mr. T. G. Barker of Charleston moved to
amend by adding the phrase, "and except incomes from agricul-
tural production. ' ' 23 Mr. Barker noted that farmers already paid
tax on all real and personal property and he "thought that was
sufficient." The debate is reported as follows:
He [Barker] went on to argue that the agriculturist was taxed
on his lands, on his stock, on his implements and on his personal
property, and he thought that was sufficient. He did not think
the proposition needed any elaborations, as he believed it to be
so manifestly fair and equal.
Mr. Prince, of Anderson, [a member of the Finance and Taxa-
tion Committee],29 held that the same rule would apply to a
manufactory and a mercantile business.
234. The News and Courier, Oct. 19, 1895, at 1, col. 2.
235. Id. The State, but not The News and Courier, reported, "Mr. Parrott made a
reference to the United States Supreme Court, and Mr. Johnstone gave him a dignified
but crushing reply." The State, Oct. 19, 1895, at 1, col. 2.
236. 1895 JouRAn at 360.
237. The News and Courier, Oct. 19, 1895, at 1, col. 2.
238. 1895 JouaRAL at 360.
239. Id. at 22.
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Mr. Barker said he was no advocate of the tax, but as it was up
he wanted to exempt the agricultural interests from double
taxes.
Mr. Prince held that the same argument would apply to all
businesses except those of professional men. [Where capital is
not a material income producing factor.]
Senator Tillman said that the farmer able to pay this income
tax would pay it. They were willing to bear their share of the
income tax if it came.
Chairman Evans said the farmers were asking for no special
favors. All they wanted was to be put on the same plane as
others. There were plenty of farmers here to look after their
interests, and he felt there would always be in the Legislature.
He said that there would be no telling where this exemption
would end if once started.
24
0
On motion by Mr. Prince, the Barker amendment was tabled by
a 98 to 27 vote.241' This decisive vote ended opposition to the
income tax proposal and it was adopted shortly thereafter. Prior
to adoption, on motion by Mr. Meares, the word "graduated" was
inserted before the phrase, "tax on incomes. '23 The following
day, The State paper editorialized that it looked forward to a
"fair trial" of this new tax which it supported "when locally ap-
plied."12 4
240. The News and Courier, Oct. 19, 1895, at 1, col. 2.
241. 1895 JouRNAL at 360.
242. Id. at 363.
243. Id. at 361. Unfortunately, the newspapers did not report Mr. Meares' explana-
tion of his amendment. The State reported only: "This amendment prevailed after Mr.
Mearnes [sic] had explained it." The State, Oct. 19, 1895, at 2, col. 1.
Section one was also amended on the floor to include the language "and may provide
for licenses on occupation and business." 1895 JoURNAL at 360. The purpose of this amend-
ment, proposed by Senator Benjamin R. Tillman, is unclear. The legislature had full
power to provide for license taxes on occupations and business as had been held in Hayne.
Perhaps Tillman thought that since the constitution was now to specify "income" taxes
as permissible, it was prudent to specify "license" taxes as well to avoid any possible
argument that income taxes were intended to pre-empt the field.
244. The editorial observed:
A graduated income tax being one of the prominent demands of the Alliance
and "Reform" platforms, the convention was in consistency bound to provide
for its imposition in this State, and it did so yesterday. We congratulate it upon
its refusal to exempt farmers from the tax. Let us hope that it will be impartially
levied and collected and that none but the very smallest incomes will be ex-
empted. We would like to see a fair trial made of this tax and to mark whether
the people relish it in practice as much as in theory. We have all advocated the
imposition of the tax by the national government; and so we shall stand to its
support when locally applied, urging, however, that the graduation of it shall
[Vol. 26
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The Convention then discussed the first proviso clause of
section one authorizing the legislature to impose a capitation tax
on certain domestic animals. A specific exception to the normal
property tax limits was required since a capitation tax would not
be imposed according to actual value. This was recognized by
Chairman Evans of the Finance and Taxation Committee when
he said, "that in the Legislature it was always argued against a
capitation tax that it was unconstitutional." '45 The capitation tax
on animals became known as the "dog tax" since it was appar-
ently designed to aid the sheep industry by discouraging the own-
ership of dogs. 246 The provision was adopted as proposed after a
good deal of humorous comment.
247
On September 20, 1895, the Committee on Municipal Corpo-
ration and Police Regulation reported a proposed new article. 48
This article became article VIII of the 1895 constitution. Section
10 of the proposed new article provided:
Section 10. That cities and towns may be [sic] exempt from
taxation except for school purposes, for five successive years
manufactories established within their limits, after the adoption
of this constitution, whose paid up capital is not less than
$10,000.24
9
The legal necessity for the section was clear to the Conven-
tion. Four years later, Justice Pope in Garrison v. City of Laurens
struck down a manufacturer's exemption, calling it "a palpable
violation of the Constitution, adopted in 1868-for that instru-
ment required all property, real and personal, to be assessed for
taxation."' 0 The Convention similarly understood that any ex-
ception to the state's basic one-class system required express con-
stitutional authorization.2' Mr. H. J. Haynsworth, of Greenville,
informed the Convention that the "city had for years an ordi-
not be so extreme as to be confiscative of the larger incomes and that the limit
of exemption be low.
The State, Oct. 19, 1895, at 4, cols. 1-2.
245. The News and Courier, Oct. 19, 1895, at 1, col. 2.
246. See comment of Mr. George D. Tillman in The News and Courier, Oct. 19, 1895,
at 1, col. 3 and editorial in The News and Courier, Oct. 21, 1895, at 4, col. 2-3.
247. 1895 JouRNAL at 363. See The State, Oct. 19, 1895, at 2, col. 2.
248. 1895 JouRNAL at 188.
249. Id. at 190.
250. Garrison v. City of Laurens, 54 S.C. 449, 455, 32 S.E. 696, 699 (1899). See also
Germania Savings Bank v. Town of Darlington, 50 S.C. 337, 27 S.E. 846 (1897).
251. Again, the Convention had misanalyzed the issue if Holzwasser is correct. New
manufacturers appear to constitute a reasonable class in an equal protection sense and
could be freely exempted under existing law.
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nance exempting new manufacturers as proposed in this ordi-
nance. The people knew it to be unconstitutional but acquiesced
in it because it commended itself to their common sense and self-
interest." '
Section 10 was introduced for debate on September 26,
1895.11 Mr. Stanyarne Wilson, of Spartanburg, mbved to strike
the section. In his view it was offensive to the one-class system.
He commented: "It was contrary to the whole scheme of the bill,
the purpose of which was to make taxation uniform and equal on
all classes of property. It proposed the exemption of a privileged
class."" A similar view was stated by Mr. W. H. Wilson, of York,
who "opposed the exemption of factories, that it was wrong in
principle; that if such a thing was permitted it might force every
town in the State to exempt factories to be on the same foot-
ing."' 55 The proponents of the exemption did not dispute its in-
consistency with the basic property tax system but argued for its
material benefits:
Mr. Patton, [of Richland] said Columbia is now exempting
manufacturers as proposed in this section and she is being built
up under that system. It was her own money that she was sur-
rendering. Her act did not hurt or affect anybody but herself.
On the principle of local self-government she ought to be al-
lowed to continue the exemptions if her people thought it was
to their interest. Suppose nobody but the Columbia people
chose to take advantage of the right to exempt? That would be
all right and no harm would be done. It seemed to him gentle-
men were trying to protect the people of the towns from them-
selves. As to poor people, they predominate, he said, in Colum-
bia and they are the very people who are most eager for the
exemption, because it does not hurt them and brings enterprises
here to give them work. All Columbia people asked was to be
left to run their own town and make money and build the capitol
city up to be a glory to the State.
Mr. Efrid [of Lexington] enquired whether Columbia could not
continue to grant the exemption if she preferred without the
special authority given in this section.
That was very doubtful Mr. Patton replied. Men learned in the
law advised him to the contrary. Certainly the attempt to ex-
empt without constitutional authority would cause disastrous
252. The State, Sept. 27, 1895, at 5, col. 1.
253. 1895 JouRNAL at 248.
254. The State, Sept. 27, 1895, at 1, col. 3.
255. The News and Courier, Sept. 27, 1895, at 1, col. 4.
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and expensive litigation. As a lawyer he favored litigation on
general principles but as a representative of the people it was
his duty to discourage it.28
The Convention was almost evenly divided on the proposition. A
motion to postpone the Wilson motion to strike passed by a 75-
74 vote. Another Wilson motion, this one to postpone indefinitely
consideration of section 10, was defeated 74 to 73. The outcome
of a vote on the merits seemed very much in question. However,
at this point, the Convention recessed until the evening.2-7 During
the recess, a compromise was apparently worked out. Shortly
after the evening session began, Mr. Floyd moved to amend to
add a referendum as a condition precedent to the grant of exemp-
tion in a city or town.2ss This amendment was agreed to. Section
10 was then passed by an 80 to 65 vote.29
The Convention adopted several new provisions strengthen-
ing the actual value standard and the one-class system:
(1) One Assessment
It will be recalled that some question existed under the 1868
constitution as to whether the actual value standard would be
violated if a city made a separate assessment for its taxing pur-
poses. The 1895 Convention made clear that there could be no
question about this in the future. It inserted a new provision,
article X, section 13, reading:
Section 13. The General Assembly shall provide for the assess-
ment of all property for taxation; and State, County, township,
school, municipal and all other taxes shall be levied on the same
assessment, which shall be that made for State taxes; and the
taxes for the subdivisions of the State shall be levied and col-
lected by the respective fiscal authorities thereof.
20
256. The State, Sept. 27, 1895, at 1, col. 3 and at 5, col. 1.
257. 1895 JOURNAL at 251.
258. Id. at 257.
259. Id. In its final form § 10 became § 8 of art. VIII which provided:
SECTION 8. Cities and towns may exempt from taxation, by general or spe-
cial ordinance, except for school purposes, manufactories established within
their limits of five successive years from the time of the establishment of such
manufactories: Provided, That such ordinance shall be first ratified by a major-
ity of such qualified electors in such city or town as shall vote at an election held
for that purpose.
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA RATrIED IN CONVENTION DECEMBER 4, 1895
at 39 (Calvo 1895).
260. Id. at 48.
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(2) Delegated Taxing Power
It will be further recalled that prior to 1895 the legislature
had authorized or permitted municipal corporations to use two
classes-real and personal-for purposes of the delegated taxing
power. 6' The Convention acted to end such classification in the
future. The Convention amended old article IX, section 8 to add
the italicized language:
Section 5. The corporate authorities of Counties, townships,
school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with
power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such
taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within
the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same.
• ..And the General Assembly shall require that all the prop-
erty, except that herein permitted to be exempted within the
limits of municipal corporations, shall be taxed for corporate
purposes and for the payment of debts contracted under author-
ity of law. 6 '
Since a municipality can only tax for corporate purposes, the
insertion of that phrase assured that all property would be taxed
as one class. 63
The Convention also made a change in the original 1865 ac-
tual value standard. The opening phrase, "All taxes upon prop-
erty, real or personal" was changed to read, "All taxes upon prop-
erty, real and personal." As ratified by the Convention, article II,
section 29 provides that: "All taxes upon property, real and per-
sonal, shall be laid upon the actual value of the property taxed,
as the same shall be ascertained by an assessment made for the
purpose of laying such tax. '24 Research indicates that the change
of "or" to "and" was not intended to have any substantive ef-
fect.2
65
261. See McIver's opinions in State ex rel. Bartless v. Beaufort, 39 S.C. 5, 17 S.E.
355 (1892) and Florida Cent. P.R.R. v. City of Columbia, 54 S.C. 266, 32 S.E. 408 (1898).
262. (Emphasis added). This provision was art. X, § 5 of the new constitution.
263. See text accompanying note 157 supra.
264. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA REATIFIED IN CONVENTION
DECEMBER 4,1895 at 20 (Calvo 1895).
265. The change from "or" to "and" is something of a mystery. On September 20,
the Committee on the Legislative Department reported an article consisting of 37 sections.
1895 JoURNAL at 191. Section 30 of this article was the actual value standard in its old
form with the phrase reading "real or personal." Id. at 195. On September 28, § 19 of the
article was stricken, which would seem ultimately to result in the renumbering of § 30 as
§ 29. Id. at 281. On October 2, § 30 was "adopted as reported." Id. at 318. On November
21, the article was read the second time without amendment to § 30. Id. at 621. On
November 26, the article was read the third time and adopted. Id. at 693. It was ordered
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The Holzwasser interpretation of the constitution could eas-
ily have been drafted by the 1895 Convention. It could have
struck all existing restraints on the taxing power. This would
return the constitution to its pre-1865 condition when the legis-
lative power to tax was unlimited. One limitation would remain
beyond the power of the Convention: the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. It would prevent arbitrary classifi-
cation and discrimination within a class.
The 1895 Convention, instead, worked to strengthen the one-
class system. In certain cases, e.g., the income tax and the manu-
facturer's exemption, the need for express exceptions to the basic
rule was recognized and granted. In other cases, e.g., one assess-
ment and municipal classification, the actual value standard was
enhanced and the one-class system emphasized.
VII.
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Following the 1895 Convention the property tax rules were
well established and understood. The questions which had arisen
between 1868 and 1895 had been resolved by the 1895 Convention.
In 1906 the attorney general ruled that a town tax of 1/8 percent
on personal property and percent on real property was in viola-
tion of the constitution. 6 David Wallace, in his 1927 study, The
Constitution of 1895, was equally clear that a classified property
tax is prohibited by the constitution." 7
referred to the Committee on Order, Style and Revision. Id. That committee reported
back on December 3, recommending no amendment to § 30. Id. at 706, 709-10. The final
ratification of the constitution occurred on December 4. Id. at 725. That evening President
Evans announced that the constitution was "now ready for the delegates to attach their
signatures thereto." Id. at 727. The constitution, as signed, for the first time contained
the word "and." S.C. CoNsT. art. m, § 29. See the original document, found in the South
Carolina Department of Archives and History, at page 22.
266. 1906 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 169. In 1969 the attorney general took the same position,
holding that "it is the opinion of this office that it is constitutionally impermissible for a
municipality to apply different rates of assessment to properties for ad valorem tax pur-
poses." 1969 Op. ATr'y GEN. 275, 276.
267. D. WAULACE, THE CoNsTrrunoN op 1895 (1927). Wallace is critical of the one-class
system, believing it to be unduly rigid and limiting on the legislature. But there was no
question in his mind that classification is prohibited. He wrote:
[Franchise taxes on corporations] are merely extra property taxes which it is
felt are just in view of the great wealth of most of such corporations, but which
cannot under the existing law forbidding classification of property be taxed
anything extra without some such device.
Id. at 105.
Another principle is that no system that rests on one kind of tax can possibly
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On March 6, 1920, the legislature adopted a concurrent reso-
lution directing the appointment of a committee for the purpose
of "making a thorough investigation and study of the subject of
taxation in South Carolina" and "recommending. . . changes in
laws" for consideration of the legislature at its next session.2 8 On
October 30, 1920, the committee submitted its report to the legis-
lature. 6 The report became popularly known as the Marion Re-
port, taking this name from its chairman, Senator J. H. Marion
of Chester.2 17 The Marion Report was a detailed and thoughtful
study of the state's tax system including recommendations for
changes. The report summarized the "salient requirements of the
fundamental law" ' as follows:
(1) All property of every kind and description, except that
specifically exempted in the Constitution itself, consisting of
property used exclusively for public purposes, schools, colleges,
charitable institutions, etc., is positively required to be assessed
and taxed ....
(2) All property is required to be taxed at actual value ....
(3) All property is required to be both assessed and taxed at
an equal and uniform rate. The language of Article X, Section
1, is, "The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation;" in connection with
which is to be read the provision of Section 6, of Article I, requir-
ing taxation of property "in proportion to its value." By reason
of these requirements, no classification of property for purposes
of taxation is possible. 2
Chapter VIII of the Marion Report was entitled: Classification of
Property for Purposes of Taxation, So As To Permit of Differen-
be just. This is recognized in the provision that the legislature may lay income,
inheritance, license, and business taxes; but the recognition is partially eclipsed
by the old fetish of equality of rate on all forms of property.
Id. at 107.
268. No. 946, [1920] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1742.
269. REPORT OF THE JOINT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, submitted
October 30, 1920, REPORTS AND REsOLUTIONS - S.C., 1921-1. [hereinafter cited as MARION
REPORT].
270. Marion was a member of the Senate Finance Committee whose chairman, Niels
Christensen of Beaufort, was also a member of the special committee. 1920 JOURNAL OF
THE SENATE 930-31. Marion resigned on January 19, 1922 to become a justice of the
supreme court. 1922 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 118. The special committee also included
Joseph A. Berry of Orangeburg, chairman of both the House Judiciary and Rules Commit-
tees. 1920 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 2069.
271. MARoN REPORT at 19.
272. Id. at 19-20. (All but the last sentence is emphasized in the original.)
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tial Rates, or of Different Methods of Taxation for Different
Classes of Property. 3 The special committee was particularly
concerned with the non-reporting of intangible personal property
(money, stocks, bonds). It estimated the value of such property
in the state to $300,000,0002 4 while only $7,413,340 had been as-
sessed in 1919.215 The non-reporting was attributed to the high
rate of the general property tax. 5 Reports received from states
which had adopted a classified tax system indicated that intangi-
ble property could be induced onto the tax rolls if a special low
rate of tax was applied to this class of property. 7 For this reason,
among others, the committee concluded that a classified system
was desirable. It noted:
From this practical experience of other States, as well as from
the reason of the thing, the Committee reached the conclusion
that the principle of classification is sound and that the General
Assembly ought to have the power to exercise a sound discretion
as to the classification of property for purposes of taxation. 5
The committee recognized that such a change in existing law
would require an amendment to the constitution. It stated:
Since this power of classification for the purpose of applying
other methods than the ad valorem tax can only be secured by
an amendment to the Constitution, it seemed proper and desira-
ble to proceed with the consideration of other possible methods
of relief.2
The committee, after examination, found other methods of relief
to be inadequate and concluded that the "amendment of the
Constitution is the one big, vital factor in the situation."''s Rec-
273. Id. at 78.
274. Id. at 43. In 1919 the total value of all reported taxable property was
$402,859,947. Id. at 44. Also, quite clearly, a good deal of tangible personal property was
unreported. An examination of returns for the year 1919 showed three watches in Abbeville
county and six watches in Clarendon county. Intangible property seemed even rarer-the
returns showed that no one in Laurens County had any money or other credits. Id. at 33.
275. Id. at 40. The special committee noted:
The weak link of the general property tax is intangible property. If this link
breaks what is the result? The minute intangible property goes off the tax rolls,
then the rule of "what's sauce for the goose is sauce for gander" applies, and
the process of undervaluation and evasion in respect of other classes of property
begins, and in the end we have the chaos that reigns in South Carolina today.
Id. at 69.
276. Id. at 26-27.
277. Id. at 79-82.
278. Id. at 82.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 132. The committee noted: "All other matters are of comparatively small
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ommended language for such an amendment was appended to
the committee's report:
ARTICLE III OF AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
Subject only to the limitations contained in this Article the
General Assembly shall have power to establish and maintain a
just and equitable system for raising State and local revenues
for public purposes. Taxes shall be levied on such subjects and
in such manner as shall be prescribed by general laws, and all
taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. All prop-
erty used exclusively for State, county, municipal, educational,
religious, benevolent and charitable purposes, and household
goods to the amount of at least one hundred ($100.00) dollars
for each family, shall be exempted from taxation.nl
On January 20, 1921, Senators Marion and Christensen intro-
duced the proposed amendment as S.79.2 The bill was referred
to the Committee on Finance which reported favorably on it the
following day.23 No further action was taken on the bill.
284
At the 1922 session, S.79 was recommitted and again the
subject of a favorable report by the Committee on Finance.28, On
January 25, 1922, the Senate debated the measure. 5 No further
moment." Id. It recognized that amending the constitution would not be an "easy task"
and would require a strong educational campaign to inform the people on the issue. Id.
The committee observed that "the States that have succeeded in freeing themselves from
constitutional limitations of this character have done so only after a period of several years
agitation and public discussion." Id. at 133.
281. Id. at 137.
282. 1921 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 67. The bill was entitled: "A Joint Resolution
proposing amendment to the Constitution by adding thereto an article conferring upon
the General Assembly power to establish a just and equitable system of raising public
revenues, to be known as Article Ell of amendments to the Constitution."
283. Id. at 88.
284. The last reference to S. 79 is on February 2 when the bill was made a special
order for the following day. Id. at 209.
285. 1922 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 9, 63.
286. Id. at 153-54 and 167.
The News and Courier reported:
The purpose of the amendment, as stated by its proponent, is to permit the
General Assembly to place a just and equitable tax on mortgages, money in
banks, etc. It was brought out today that, while such a tax might be imposed
now, it would under the ad valorem tax system of the State, be excessive and
would drive business from the State. It is for reasons of public policy, as Senator
Laney of Chesterfield, expressed it today, that real estate mortgages, money in
banks, etc. are not required to be returned for taxation.
Senator Christensen in calling on the resolution for discussion said that this
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resolution was part of the program for tax changes to be submitted to this
General Assembly. He said this resolution had been drawn by the senate mem-
bers of the committee appointed to study the tax situation of the State with a
view to recommending remedial measures. He said the amendment would give
the General Assembly power to tax bonds, mortgages, money in banks, etc.
Senator Ragsdale, of Fairfield, thought the measure a dangerous one and
moved to strike out the resolving words of the resolution. He did not think the
General Assembly should have the power to fix one rate of assessment on some
property and a different rate on other property.
Senator McGhee, of Greenwood, spoke with vigor in favor of the amend-
ment and [incidentally] touched upon general conditions in the course of his
remarks. He said that he had felt for some time that a constitutional convention
was necessary because of the tax situation in the State, but that it seemed
impossible to get one. He expressed the hope that if one is ever held that there
will be a provision in the Constitution that one must be held every ten years.
The Senate ought to get right down to rock bottom and settle the tax
question once and for all, said the Greenwood Senator. "I do think that we ought
to cut, and when we do cut, cut to the bone. I don't think there ought to be a
mill tax placed on property. When we can go back and tell the people that there
will be no tax on tangible property at all we will have accomplished some-
thing," said the Senator from Greenwood, who expressed the belief that the
finance committee and the General Assembly can propose such measures as will
eliminate the property tax.
Senator McGhee said that he believes in luxury taxes. He would impose a
tax on rouge, paints, cosmetics, soft drinks, gasoline, etc. He said that South
Carolina was not alone in its financial distress and the boll weevil was not the
cause of all the trouble. The Middle West is in worse condition than South
Carolina.
Senator Watkins, of Anderson, said that the report of the tax committee
appointed by the General Assembly answered fully all objections that had been
raised to the measure. He said he felt sure that in the event of the approval of
the amendment by the people at the general election the General Assemblies of
the future would not in any instance impose a tax that was confiscatory.
Senator McColl, of Marlboro, said he was in favor of the purposes of the
bill, but thinks passage of such legislation at this time would be unhappy and
possibly frought with grave danger to the State.
Senator Pearce, of Richland, said that he had been in the Senate four years
and every year the objection had been raised that it was not the proper time.
He thought the bill a good one and looks to the protection of the man who owns
his little home. He thought mortgages and money in the banks should be taxed.
The resolution before the Senate only gives the people the right to say whether
or not they wish the Constitution changed.
Senator Laney, of Chesterfield, pleaded for the passage of the resolution.
He declared that millions of dollars in valuable taxes are escaping because of
the present law, this being wealth represented by mortgages and cash. The
money interests are against the bill, he said. When you touch the money inter-
ests you touch a tender spot. One of the main purposes of the bill is to relieve
the property owners of the state, to relieve the tax upon John Smith and his little
home and his ox cart and his buggy and to shift it upon wealth where it belongs.
The Senator from Chesterfield declared that under the ad valorem system
provided by the Constitution the tax on mortgages would be too heavy now. If
this resolution is passed by the people the next General Assembly would classify
property so that a reasonable tax would be imposed on mortgages, cash, etc.
Mortgages are not returned now because it would be against public policy.
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action was taken in the Senate.2s On January 26, 1922, the
amendment was introduced in the House;2ss twelve days later, on
The amendment, Senator Laney declared, would enable the General As-
sembly to place its hands on millions of dollars worth of taxable property not
paying a cent now. There are some people who are against it, as there are some
who are opposed to any taxes. The moving picture people are protesting against
the tix on moving picture films. "When the old income tax measure rolled into
the Senate chamber from the House here comes a bunch of wealth to oppose."
he said. "Telegrams are [coming] from all over the State to touch wealth
lightly. It all depends on whose ox is being gored. We have been goring the ox
of the farmer for a long time. I hope and believe the present General Assembly
will give him relief."
Senator Bonham, of Greenville, began his argument against the amend-
ment but was interrupted by adjournment for dinner. He approves of most of
the remedial measures before the Senate but thinks there must be a safeguard
somewhere. The greatest complaint today, he said, of the federal government is
its tendency to get away from constitutional inhibition. The greatest danger that
confronts the South today is centralization of power at Washington. He said he
did not think it safe to take the bridle off entirely and leave it to the General
Assembly to fix the proportionate amount of taxes to be paid by various classes
of property, etc.
The debate on the amendment continued for more than two hours at the
night session but again no vote was reached. Debate was adjourned until tomor-
row morning. Senators Beasley, Hart and Christensen spoke in favor of the bill
and Senators Wightman, Duncan, Baskin, and Williams spoke against it.
Senator Christensen announced that if the amendment was rejected he
would introduce a resolution to instruct the tax commission to enforce Article
10, Section 1, of the Constitution, which requires all property to be assessed at
a uniform and equal rate. He said that some of the Senators had urged in their
speeches against the amendment that the Senate stand by the Constitution,
while others had argued that there was no necessity for changing it. He wanted
to place them on the record.
The News and Courier, Jan. 26, 1922, at 1, col. 3. See also The State, Jan. 26, 1922, at 7,
col. 1.
287. On February 22, 1922, the News and Courier noted with regret the resignation
of Senator Christensen as Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. The News and
Courier, Feb. 22, 1922, at 4, col. 1. The newspaper editorial referred to his "disappoint-
ment over the indisposition of the Senate to adopt the tax program in its entirety." Id.
288. The amendment was introduced as H. 944 by Claud Sapp of Richland. 1922
JOURNAL oF 'rE HousE 230. It was reported favorably by the Ways and Means Committee
on January 27. Id. at 253. On February 2, it passed a second reading by a vote of 83-0. Id.
at 334-46. It passed a third reading on February 3 by a 91-6 vote. Id. at 393-95.
The News and Courier reported on the House passage of the amendment as follows:
An important part of the tax progress is the proposed constitutional amendment
by which the legislature would have the right to classify various kinds of prop-
erty. The idea is to have the General Assembly grade or classify property, in
order that one basis of action may apply to one class and another basis to other
classes. The idea is that bank deposits or credits might pay taxes on one basis,
real estate on another, mortgage holdings on [another]. The General Assembly
would be the judge. At present the theory of the constitution is that all taxable
property should be taxed and classified on the same basis. The proposed consti-
tutional amendment would have to be voted this fall. The resolution authorizing
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February 7, 1922, it passed the House by a 91-6 vote.21
In sum, the Senate, after serious consideration at two ses-
sions, refused to submit the amendment to the people.
Vin.
LATER JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
Some of the major cases dealing with income taxes and excise
taxes are discussed below.
A. Income Taxes
In 1897, two years after the Convention had authorized "a
graduated tax on incomes," the legislature enacted an income tax
law.20 This concise statute, two and a half pages in length, im-
posed a tax upon all gains, profits or income from whatever source
derived. 29' The only deduction permitted was for "necessary ex-
penses actually incurred in carrying on any business. ' 9 2 The tax
rate was as follows: 0 to $2,500 - exempt; $2,500 to $5,000 - 1%;
$5,000 to $7,500 - 1.5%; $7,500 to $10,000 - 2%; $10,000 to $15,000
- 2.5%; and over $15,000 - 3%.293
The legality of the act was tested in Alderman v. Wells.
94 Of
course, in view of the special constitutional provision there was
little question as to the act's validity under the state constitution.
Alderman based his attack on the federal fourteenth amendment,
particularly the equal protection clause. He asserted that the
exemption of income under $2,500, the graduated rate scale, and
the exemption of corporations all resulted in arbitrary and unrea-
sonable classifications. 29 The court rejected the argument citing
the Supreme Court's 1890 decision in Bell's Gap R.R.299 which
stated that the equal protection clause "was not intended to corn-
such a vote has passed the House (the Sapp measure) and it is under considera-
tion on the Senate side.
The News and Courier, Feb. 14, 1922, at 2, col. 2.
The State paper reported:
The House during the week also sent to the Senate the Sapp resolution, provid-
ing for the amendment of the state constitution so as to establish a just and
equitable system of raising state revenues. This bill, considered the piece de
resistance of the tax reform program, is on the senate calendar as a second
reading bill, having been reported favorably by the senate finance committee.
The State, Feb. 13, 1922, at 8, col. 1.
289. 1922 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE at 393-95.
290. No. 335, [1897] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 529.
291. Id. at § 1.
292. Id. at § 2.
293. Id. at § 1. Section 3 of the act excluded corporations from the tax, perhaps on
the theory that corporations were already subject to a franchise tax.
294. 85 S.C. 507, 67 S.E. 781 (1910).
295. Id. at 509, 67 S.E. at 781-82.
1974]
71
Quirk and Watkins: A Constitutional History of the Property Tax in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pel the States to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation. 1 17 Only the
most extreme proposal would bring the clause into play. The
Supreme Court noted:
But clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons
and classes, especially such as are of an unusual character, un-
known to the practice of our government, might be obnoxious
to the constitutional prolibition.9 8
The income tax was consequently upheld. This result is not sur-
prising in view of Bell's Gap and other Supreme Court cases
which had been decided prior to the 1895 Convention. Under the
Holzwasser theory that equal protection is the sole limit on the
taxing power, the legislature was fully empowered, prior to the
specific 1895 provision, to enact an income tax law. The
Alderman court did not, however, consider the case in this way.
It relied upon the 1895 provision to justify the classification found
in the income tax act. The court discussed Alderman's argument
that the act violated the article X, section one requirement that
the legislature provide for a "uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment and taxation" and "prescribe regulations to secure a just
valuation for taxation of all property" as follows:
The section, however, has this important proviso: "That the
General Assembly may provide for a graduated tax on incomes."
These provisions must be construed together, and, by the prov-
iso, taxes on incomes are excepted from the requirement of a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation of all prop-
erty; for it is impossible to conceive how a tax on income could
be graduated, without exempting some incomes, or without
making the tax higher on some than others.29
Plainly, the court believed the special 1895 provision to be critical
to its decision. The Alderman case thus settled the basic ques-
tions which might arise with an income tax.
In 1922 the legislature enacted a new income tax act covering
both individuals and corporations.3 0 The interesting aspect of
this act was its simplicity-it required payment to the state of
one-third of the taxpayer's federal tax liability?"0 In Santee Mills
297. 134 U.S. at 237, quoted at 85 S.C. at 516, 67 S.E. at 784.
298. Id. at 237, quoted at 85 S.C. at 515, 67 S.E. at 784.
299. 85 S.C. at 517, 67 S.E. at 784.
300. No. 502, [1922] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 896. The earlier income tax had been
repealed in 1918. No. 433, [1918] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 773.
301. Id. at § 3. This section required payment to the state of "a sum equal to thirty-
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v. Query3°2 the taxpayer directed his attack against this incorpo-
ration by reference approach on the grounds that it was an unlaw-
ful delegation of the legislative power. The dourt held that incor-
poration of existing federal law was proper and construed the act
as attempting nothing more."' It strongly implied that it would
hold invalid an act which purported to incorporate future federal
law.30 4 Four years later, the legislature adopted the Income Tax
Act of 1926 which, with amendments, remains the operative in-
come tax statute."5
In 1933, the legislature enacted a five percent tax, in addition
to all other taxes, on dividends and interest received by individu-
als in excess of $100.311 In Marshall v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n.3°7 a taxpayer argued that this tax was in substance a
property tax and invalid since it was imposed only on a particular
class of property. The court adopted the circuit judge's order
which stated: "The tax in question is very clearly a tax upon
income, which income is derived from certain intangible prop-
erty. It is not a tax upon the intangible property itself."03 The
taxpayer's secondary argument, that even if the tax was properly
characterized as an income tax it violated equal protection, was
also rejected.
B. Excise Taxes
The state's current sales tax was imposed as part of the Gen-
eral Appropriation Act of 1951.309 The act imposed a general three
percent rate on retail sales.310 Specified exceptions from this rate
were as follows: the maximum tax on an article sold at $1,500 or
less was $25.00; on an article sold at between $1,500 and $3,000
the maximum tax was $40.00; and on an article sold at more than
three and one-third (33 1/3%) of the amount required to be paid to the United States
Government. .. "
302. 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922).
303. Id. at 168-69, 115 S.E. at 205.
304. Id. The court noted that the state tax based on one-third of federal liability
would become complicated as the federal law changed. In an understatement, the court
said: "It is conceivable that changes in the Federal law occurring subsequent to the
approval of the State Act might lead to complications in its enforcement." Id. at 169, 115
S.E. at 206.
305. No. 1, [1927] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1.
306. No. 406, [1933] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 567; § 8(e) at 574.
307. 178 S.C. 57, 182 S.E. 96 (1935).
308. Id. at 60, 182 S.E. at 97.
309. No. 379, [1951] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 546, 677-704.
310. Id. at 685-89.
1974]
73
Quirk and Watkins: A Constitutional History of the Property Tax in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
$3,000 the maximum tax was $75.00.311 This approach effected a
reverse graduation with the tax rate decreasing as the value in-
creased. In Roddey v. Byrnes"' the tax was upheld. The taxpayer
maintained that the tax was a property tax and invalid since not
in proportion to actual value. The court held the tax to be an
excise rather than a property tax. It noted:
Relator complains and cites Sec. 6 of Article I of the Constitu-
tion as follows: "All property subject to taxation shall be taxed
in proportion to its value." But this provision is inapplicable to
license or excise taxes, which the sales tax is.' 3
Additionally the court made it clear that the property tax
limitations were inapplicable. It stated:
In general, the sales tax is an imposition upon the privilege of
the business of selling at retail and measured by the amount of
business done, which is a clear case of an excise tax to which the
constitutional provisions relating to property taxes are irrele-
vant.
311
The statute contained over two pages of exemptions"5 and this
led the taxpayer to make an equal protection argument. The
court quoted favorably from an earlier decision stating that a tax
classification will be struck down only if it is shown that it "has
its origin in nothing better than whim and fantasy and tyrannical
exercise of arbitrary power .... "316 The court found that "whim
and fantasy" had not been shown and upheld the act.
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query involved a six cents per
gallon tax on gasoline purchased outside the state and used
within the state .'7 The taxpayer argued that the tax was a prop-
311. Id.
312. 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951).
313. Id. at 513, 66 S.E.2d at 44-45.
314. Id. at 514, 66 S.E.2d at 45. The court cited to the 1931 decision in Gregg Dyeing
Co.:
An excellent differentiation of these forms of taxes, supported by many cita-
tions, is found in our decision of Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 166 S.C. 117, 164
S.E. 588 (1931), affirmed, 296 U.S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232, 84 A.L.R.
831, in which it was held by this court that a tax on the use and consumption
of gasoline is an excise and not a property tax, and the levy was upheld by both
courts after vigorous contest.
Id. at 514, 66 S.E.2d at 45.
315. No. 379, [1951] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 546, 686-88.
316. 219 S.C. at 515, 66 S.E.2d at 46, quoting Marshall v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 178 S.C.
57, 62, 182 S.E. 96, 98 (1935).
317. 166 S.C. 117, 164 S.E. 588 (1931), aff'd, 286 U.S. 472 (1931), interpreting No.
833, [19301 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1390.
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erty tax and invalid since it was not assessed according to value
or otherwise within the terms of article X, section 1. The court
believed the issue to be: "If the tax is a property tax, this section
applies; if an excise, it is inapplicable.""3 ' It will be recalled that
this was not the approach of Hayne.31 1 Hayne was clear that all
taxes must comply with the equality and uniformity provision of
section one. This aspect of Hayne seems to have been silently
overruled. Its loss is not material since the provision, standing
alone, was duplicative of equal protection. Its critical significance
is its relation to the actual value standard, supplying the require-
ment of equality of tax rate to be applied against the constitution-
ally established class, the actual value of all property.
The Gregg Dyeing court, after holding the tax to be an excise
rather than a property tax, had no difficulty in upholding the
statute. The court expressed its view that the legislature's power
to impose excise taxes was unrestrained as follows:
In South Carolina, neither the Constitution of 1868 nor 1895
expressly or impliedly makes reference to excise taxes, though
their existence must naturally be assumed to have been known
to the framers of these instruments. The lack of restriction in
them on the inherent power of the Legislature to impose such
taxes affords ground for the conclusion that the power was pur-
posely left unrestricted while the mode of exercising other taxing
powers was provided for.
Hence, there have been heretofore recognized in South Carolina,
such excise taxes as those on inheritances, documentary stamps,
corporate privileges and franchises, the sale of gasoline and the
like.
We find no inhibition in our State Constitution and hold that
the Legislature has the power to exact this tax .3
In the above cases, and a number of others,32" ' the critical issue
318. 166 S.C. at 133, 164 S.E. at 594.
319. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
320. 166 S.C. at 136-37, 64 S.E. at 595.
321. (1) Thomas v. Town Council of Moultrieville, 52 S.C. 181, 184, 29 S.E. 647, 648
(1898) (a town tax of $8 on each lot for street work held valid since "not a tax upon
property"); (2) State v. Tucker, 56 S.C. 516, 522, 35 S.E. 215, 218 (1900) (a statute
requiring land owners in certain counties to remove trash, trees, etc. from running streams
held invalid since not based on taxing power and alternatively, if considered a property
tax it would violate the constitution "which provided that all property subject to taxation
shall be taxed according to its actual value, as ascertained by an assessment made for the
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was the characterization of the tax as a property or non-property
tax. A non-property tax was certain to be upheld since the power
was only limited by the faint restriction of equal protection. A
property tax, on the other hand, had to comply with the one-class
rule. Since 1868 it was express that an equal rate of taxation must
purpose"); (3) Hill v. City Council of Abbeville, 59 S.C. 396, 38 S.E. 11 (1900) (city license
tax on certain occupations held valid since not a property tax); (4) Coward v. City Council
of Greenville, 67 S.C. 35, 45 S.E. 122 (1903) (a town license tax upheld on authority of
Abbeville); (5) Ware Shoals Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 78 S.C. 211, 58 S.E. 811 (1907) (a state
license tax on the basis of the capital of domestic corporations held valid as a tax on a
privilege and not a tax on property); (6) Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421 (1915)
(license fees on vehicles in Richland County held valid since not a property tax); (7) State
v. Touchberry, 121 S.C. 5, 113 S.E. 345 (1922) (a license fee on vehicles in Clarendon
County held permissible on the authority of Lillard); (8) Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 147 S.C. 116, 134, 144 S.E. 846, 852 (1928) (state license tax on retailers of soft
drinks held valid since constitutional provisions "applicable only to a property tax"); (9)
Pickelsimer v. Pratt, 198 S.C. 225, 17 S.E.2d 524 (1941) (a state tax levied on employers
under the Unemployment Compensation Act held valid since an excise tax and not an ad
valorem property tax); (10) Anderson v. Page, 208 S.C. 146, 37 S.E.2d 289 (1946) (gradu-
ated tax on personal property of estates in Spartanburg County held valid since not a
property tax); (11) Distin v. Bolding, 240 S.C. 545, 553-54, 126 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1962) (an
act creating a special sewer district in Richland County and providing for special assess-
ment "measured by the benefit conferred" upheld since not "taxation within the provi-
sions of the state constitution regulating or prescribing the manner of taxation").
In Anderson the court quoted an earlier decision:
Such special forms of taxation (here graduated rates upon estates and there
licenses upon vehicles - interpolated) are clearly not within constitutional limi-
tations governing the imposition of taxes upon real and personal property.
208 S.C. at 152, 37 S.E.2d at 291.
Webster v. Williams, 183 S.C. 368, 377,191 S.E. 51, 55 (1937), involved a state statute
which imposed an additional payment of one percent per month on all delinquent taxes
in Orangeburg County. The court held the act invalid as a penalty imposed by a special
law and further discussed the validity of the act as an exercise of the taxing power as
follows:
If the one per cent imposition were sustained as a tax on the suggested theory
of a classification of taxpayers into those who are delinquent and those who are
not delinquent, we would be confronted with the anomaly that real and personal
property may be classified for taxation according to its ownership by those who
are able to pay their taxes promptly and those who are not so able, rather than
strictly according to the value of such property on an assessment basis. It has
not been suggested by the respondents how, in such event, they could escape
the constitutional rules upon which property shall be assessed and taxed in this
State. See, for example, Article 10, § 1, requiring "a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation"; Article 10, § 3, providing that no tax shall be levied
except in pursuance of a law which shall distinctly state the object of the same;
Article 10, § 5, providing that County taxes shall be uniform in respect to
persons and property within the jurisdiction of the County; Article 10, § 13,
requiring that County taxes shall be based upon assessments, and shall be levied
on the same assessment made for State taxes. Article 3, § 29, requiring that all
property taxes shall be levied upon the actual value of the property taxes [sic],
as ascertained by an assessment made for the purpose of laying such tax.
Id. at 376-77, 191 S.E. at 54-55.
76
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss3/7
PROPERTY TAX
be applied against a fixed class, the actual value of all property.
All of these cases have missed the point if property can be
freely classified.
Ix.
LATER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The constitutional provisions authorizing the taxation of all
property, of course, included intangible personal property within
the class. For example, an 1874 statute provided that "all real
and personal property . . . shall be subject to taxation. '3 2  Per-
sonal property was defined as "all things, other than real estate,
which have any pecuniary value, and moneys, credits, invest-
ments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or otherwise."
323
This was also noted by the supreme court in a 1960 decision where
it stated, "the code had [prior to 1932] included provisions with
respect to taxation of intangible personal property along with
other taxable property.
3
1
24
In 1932, a constitutional amendment to article X, section 1
was ratified.3 5 The following new proviso clause was added:
Provided, Further, That the General Assembly may provide by
law for the assessment of all intangible personal property, in-
cluding moneys, credits, bank deposits, corporate stocks, and
bonds, at its true value for taxation for State, County and Mu-
nicipal purposes or either thereof: Provided, That the total rate
of taxation imposed thereon shall never exceed one-half of one
percentum of the actual value of such intangible property:
Provided, Further, That such intangible personal property shall
not be subject to the three mill levy provided by Section 10,
Article 11, of this instrument or to any other general or special
tax levy, except such as is especially provided by the General
Assembly by the authority and within the limitation of this
provision; nor shall such intangible personal property be consid-
ered a part of "taxable property" as such term is used in this
instrument, of the State or any subdivision thereof.
In more simplified form the amendment provided for:
322. No. 631, [1874] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 731 at § 1.
323. Id. at § 4.
324. Francis Marion Life Ins. Co. v. City of Columbia, 237 S.C. 162, 165, 115 S.E.2d
796, 798 (1960).
325. No. 603, [1932] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1126. The amendment was proposed by
No. 809, [1930] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1349 and voted upon by the people.
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(1) A General Prohibition-"intangible personal property
shall not be subject to. . .any other general or special tax levy,
except such as is. . .within the limitation of this amendment."
(2) Limitation-"That the total rate of taxation imposed
thereon shall never exceed one-half of one p~rcentum of actual
value."
The amendment consequently created a sub-class of property
which was to be taxed in a particular way.
There was no need for this amendment if Holzwasser is cor-
rect. Intangible personal property is certainly not an arbitrary
classification. The legislature was consequently free, without con-
stitutional amendment, to treat intangible property separately.
With a one-class system, however, no separate treatment
could be provided for intangibles or any other kind of property.
The rate must be equal against all property. The creation of a
sub-class requires constitutional amendment. The 1932
amendment consequently establishes an express exception to the
constitutional one-class rule.
X.
RECENT LITIGATION
In 1972, after over one hundred years of consistent judicial
and legislative interpretation, the legislature enacted Act No.
1266.326 The act directed the South Carolina Tax Commission to
assess the real and personal property of manufacturers "to arrive
at a nine and one-half percent assessment ratio."' The statute
assured that manufacturers' property would be taxed at a differ-
ent, and higher, rate than other property. Two classes of property
were created.
The statutory phrase "assessment ratio" requires explana-
326. No. 1266, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2467. See also notes 87 and 88 supra.
327. Id. at § 1. Even prior to 1972, the Tax Commission had used assessment ratios
for manufacturers in this neighborhood. See Newberry Mills, Inc. v. Dawkins, 259 S.C. 7,
190 S.E.2d 503 (1972), for the use of a ten percent assessment ratio for the tax year, 1970.
Apparently the first statutory reference to assessment ratios was in relation to merchant's
inventory. No. 709, [1962] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1705.
Section one of No. 1266, quoted in text, contained a proviso clause as follows:
"Provided, further, the ratio of any existing manufacturer shall not be adjusted more than
one percent per year while the present ratio is either above or below the nine and one-
half percent ratio." The proviso clause became the subject of litigation in Nancy Fashions,
Inc. v. Brady, (Seventh Judicial Circuit, Order of Judge Spruill dated August 2, 1974).
See note 351 infra.
[Vol. 26
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tion. Assume property X has an actual value of $100,000 and is
subject to an assessment ratio of 4.5 percent. The cdmputation
is 4.5% of $100,000 = $4,500. This figure is dalled assessed value.
The tax rate (assume 100 mills) is then applied against $4,500 to
give a tax liability of $450. It is immediately apparent that the
same result would be achieved if the millage were set at 4.5 and
applied against the actual value of $100,000. For this reason, the
use of assessment ratios at best involves an unnecessary step.
They are apparently designed to mislead the people into thinking
that they are underassessed since the tax rate is applied against
a low figure.
Where different assessment ratios are used for different prop-
erty, the purpose is to further confuse. Assume two pieces of prop-
erty, A and B, each with an actual value of $100,000. If A is
subject to an assessment ratio of ten percent and B is subject to
a five percent ratio the computation would be for A - 10% of
$100,000 = $10,000; for B - 5% of $100,000 = $5,000. The rate of
tax (assume 100 mills) is then applied against the resulting figure,
A - 100 mills x $10,000 = $1,000 of tax liability; B - 100 mills x
$5,000 = $500 of tax liability. It is immediately apparent that the
use of different assessment ratios is simply an indirect means of
applying a different tax rate to property A and B. If manufactur-
ers' property is assessed on a 9.5 assessment ratio and the remain-
ing property in the county is assessed at a 4.75 ratio, the effect is
to double the tax rate on the manufacturers' property. And yet,
since 1868, the constitution has required an "equal rate of assess-
ment and taxation." 328
Assessment ratios are irrelevent to the constitutional pattern
of taxation. The framers did not contemplate the use of such an
intermediate step. The constitutional scheme is complete with
the establishment of an equal rate of tax and the determination
of the class, the actual value of all property.
In Newberry Mills v. Dawkins, the taxpayer filed its property
tax return for the year 1970 reporting an actual value of about
$4,800,000.329 The great bulk of this amount was attributable to
personal property, $4,200,000. 31 Real property amounted to about
$600,000.33I The Tax Commission applied an assessment ratio in
328. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1868). For a comparative study of state constitutional
limitations, see J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUAIATY IN STATE
TAXATION (1959).
329. 259 S.C. 7, 11, 190 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1972).
330. Record at 68, Newberry Mills, Inc. v. Dawkins, 259 S.C. 7, 190 S.E.2d 503.
331. Id.
1974]
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excess of ten percent and arrived at a total assessed value of about
$508,000.2 Newberry Mills appealed to the Tax Board of Review
arguing that an assessment ratio of five percent was proper. The
county had recently completed a reassessment program for real
property and it seemed agreed that a five *percent assessment
ratio -was generally applied."3 The Board accepted Newberry's
contention with respect to real property and ordered that the five
percent figure be used."' As to personal property, the Board up-
held the Tax Commission. It found nothing in the record to show
the assessment ratio used for personal property.335 It noted, how-
ever, that merchants' inventory was by statute to be assessed at
ten percent and "assumed. . .that most of the personal property
in Newberry County is assessed at the rate of.ten (10%) per-
cent." ' It consequently found that the ten percent ratio used for
the personal property of Newberry Mills was the same rate ap-
plied to other personal property in the county."7 The Board,
therefore, adopted a pure two-class theory:338 that all real prop-
erty within the county must be taxed at the same rate and all
personal property within the county must be taxed at the same
rate. But these two rates need not be the same; a five percent
assessment ratio could be used for real property and a ten percent
ratio for personal property.
As a result of the Board's decision, Newberry Mills received
some theoretical satisfaction but little economic gain.
The Board had affirmed the ten percent personal property
assessment ratio and personal property was about 87.5 percent of
Newberry Mill's tax base. Newberry Mills went to court to reverse
the Board. The county might also have contested the Board's
ruling since the Board reduced the real property assessment ratio
from ten to five percent. The county failed to do so, however, and
that issue would have to wait to be decided in Holzwasser.
Newberry Mills argued to the supreme court that the Board's
two-class theory violated the state constitution and the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause.339 In retrospect, it
appears that the equal protection argument was very unfortun-
332. 259 S.C. at 11, 190 S.E.2d at 504.05.
333. Record at 59, Newberry Mills, Inc. v. Dawkins, 259 S.C. 7, 190 S.E.2d 503.
334. Id. at 60.
335. Id. at 59.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 60.
338. This may be contrasted with the Holtzwasser court's multi-class approach.
339. Brief for Appellant at 6-7.
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ate. The 1890 decision in Bell's Gap had assured that the argu-
ment could not succeed.40 Further, the equal protection issue
confused analysis by the parties and the court in both Newberry
Mills and Holzwasser. The only serious issue in these cases was
the proper interpretation of the state constitution. But attention
to this issue was continuously deflected by consideration of equal
protection. Evidence of the confusion caused by equal protection
may be noted in the following quote from the court's opinion:
We find no constitutional or statutory provision that prohibits
the assessment of real property at a different rate from personal
property. All that is required is "a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation." This requirement has been inter-
preted as follows:
"Generally, within constitutional limitations, the state has
power to classify persons or property for purposes of taxation,
and the exercise of such power is not forbidden by the constitu-
tional requirement that taxation be uniform and equal provided
the tax is uniform on all members of the same class and pro-
vided the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary." 84 C.
J. S. Taxation § 36 p. 112.311
Two separate ideas, (1) the meaning of the state constitution and
(2) equal protection, have become confused. The court gave no
textual or historical analysis of the state constitutional provi-
sions .342
340. Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890). See text accompanying
note 296 supra.
341. 259 S.C. at 13, 190 S.E.2d at 506.
342. Justice Bussey, dissenting for himself and Justice Brailsford, thought that in
view of the "clear language of our several constitutional provisions, it is to me quite
understandable that this court has not heretofore been called upon to expressly decide the
precise issue." 259 S.C. at 19, 190 S.E.2d at 509. The dissenters found the state constitu-
tional provisions clear and unambiguous. They noted:
In brief summary, it is my view that the language of our Constitution is
clear, unambiguous and compelling that real and tangible personal property
have to be treated equally and alike for the purpose of ad valorem property
taxes. And, if there were any need for construction, there is a complete absence
of any authority whatsoever from this or any other jurisdiction to support the
conclusion reached below and sustained by the majority opinion, all authority
being to the contrary.
Id. at 20, 190 S.E.2d at 509.
The dissenters made the further point that a number of the court's earlier decisions only
made sense on the premise that a property tax can not be classified. They stated:
There are, however, several cases, not directly in point, which throw at least
some light upon the matter. See: Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 166 S.C. 117, 164
S.E. 588, aff. 286 U.S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232, 84 A.L.R. 831; Thomas
1974]
81
Quirk and Watkins: A Constitutional History of the Property Tax in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
Following Newberry Mills, two interpretations of the case
seemed possible. One, based on the above quote, was that the
court would uphold any classification "provided the classification
is reasonable and not arbitrary." The second interpretation was
that the court was upholding and adopting the Board's two-class
theory.- 3 Holzwasser would provide the answer.
Mary S. Holzwasser owned land and a building in Spartan-
burg County.34 ' The property was leased to Arrow Automotive
Industries, Inc., a manufacturer engaged in rebuilding automo-
tive electrical parts.3 5 No personal property was involved in the
case since the lessee apparently owned all equipment and similar
property. Mrs. Holzwasser's real property for the year 1972 was
assessed by the Tax Commission on the basis of a 9.5 percent
assessment ratio."' The Holzwasser property was found to have
an actual value of $288,000.117 A tax rate of about 194 mills was
then applied to the resulting figure. 348 The following chart com-
pares the different tax methods used for manufacturers and non-
manufacturers:
Manufacturer's Non-Manufacturer's
Property Property
Actual Value $288,000.00 $288,000.00
Assessment Ratio 9.5% 4.2%
Taxable or Assessed Value $27,360.00 $12,096.00
Tax Rate .1938 .1938
Tax Liability $5,302.37 $2,344.21
Mrs. Holzwasser asserted that she should pay only $2,344.21 since
v. Town Council of Moultrieville, 52 S.C. 181, 29 S.E. 647; State v. Tucker, 56
S.C. 516, 35 S.E. 215. In each of these cases the Court held that the particular
statute involved imposed no ad valorem tax on property. The clear import or
holding of each of those cases, however, was to the effect that had the particular
statutes in fact imposed an ad valorem tax on property, such would have been
unconstitutional under the ad valorem property tax provisions of our Constitu-
tion with which we are here concerned.
Id. at 19, 190 S.E.2d at 509.
343. This interpretation was based on the word "therefore" in the second sentence
of the following quote:
The order of the Tax Board of Review requires the Commission to use the
same ratios for manufacturers' realty and personalty as used by local authorities
for realty and personalty of other taxpayers. There is therefore equality and
uniformity in the assessment as required by the constitutions and statutes.
Id. at 13-14, 190 S.E.2d at 506 (emphasis added).
344. 205 S.E.2d at 702.
345. Record at 1, Holzwasser v. Brady, 205 S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 1974).
346. 205 S.E.2d at 702.
347. Id.
348. Record at 9.
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real property can not be classified. She was successful in the
circuit court,39 but lost in the supreme court."'
The court again gave no textual or historical analysis of the
state constitutional provisions. It stated:
We find nothing in our Constitution that prohibits the General
Assembly of this state from classifying property according to its
use so long as such classification is reasonable and not arbitrary,
and the tax imposed is uniform on the same class of property. 51
In substance, the state constitutional provisions were viewed as
duplicative of the federal equal protection clause. They prohibit
an unreasonable and arbitrary classification, but nothing more.3
2
The Holzwasser result is incoherent in view of the state's
constitutional history.
349. Id. at 8.
350. 205 S.E.2d at 704.
351. Id.; see text accompanying note 1 supra. A proviso to No. 1266 established a
phase-in period during which the assessment ratio on a manufacturer's property would
be lowered no more than one percent per year until the 9.5 percent figure was reached.
Under this approach, if Plant A was subject to an assessment ratio of 15 percent in 1971,
it would be reduced for 1972 to 14 percent.
Following Holzwasser, the phase-in proviso was held unconstitutional since it resulted
in a tax which was not uniform on the same class of property. Nancy Fashions, Inc. v.
Brady, (Seventh Judicial Circuit, Order of Judge Spruill dated Aug. 2, 1974). The decision
was not appealed. On August 26, 1974, the Tax Commission announced that it would
follow Nancy Fashions and assess all manufacturers' property on the basis of the 9.5
assessment ratio. The State, Aug. 27, 1974, at 1-B, col. 3.
352. The appropriate means of changing a constitution is by use of the amendment
process. In 1920, as previously discussed, the central recommendation of the MARION
REPORT was an amendment to the constitution which would have permitted classification.
In 1969, the Study Committee on the South Carolina Constitution drafted language which
would have accomplished the Holzwasser result. The proposed language provided:
The General Assembly shall provide for the assessment of taxable property at
actual value or according to such classification as may be prescribed by general
law.
Proposed art. IV, § A, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE To MAKE A STUDY OF THE SoUTH
CAROLINA CONsTIrUTION OF 1895, 74 (1969). The proposal has not been submitted to the
people.
The legislature at its recent session, considered, but did not act upon, several other
versions of a proposed amendment. S.J. Res. 442, 100th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1973). The
history of this proposal is as follows: Senate Action: Introduced and referred to the Judi-
ciary Committee-May 10, 1973. Committee Report with majority favorable, minority
unfavorable-May 23, 1973; Recommended to the Judiciary Committee-January 10,
1974; committee report favorable, with amendment-June 6, 1974; second reading-June
20, 1974; Amended-June 25, 1974; Third reading-June 26, 1974; Nonconcurrence-July
2, 1974; Conference committee appointed-July 3, 1974.
House Action: Introduced and referred to the Judiciary Committee-June 27, 1974;
Recalled-June 27, 1974; Amended and second reading-June 29, 1974; Rejected-July
1, 1974; Reconsidered and third reading-July 2, 1974; Confdrence Committee ap-
pointed-July 3, 1974. 1 83
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CONCLUSION
In 1865, for the specific purpose of prohibiting legislative
classification, the constitution established the actual value of all
property as one class. The provision read:
All taxes upon property, real or personal, shall be laid upon the
actual value of the property taxed, as the same shall be ascer-
tained by an assessment made for the purpose of laying such
tax.35
3
In 1868, to assure that the same rate of tax would be applied
against all property, the constitution was amended to require the
legislature to provide for
a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall
prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for
taxation of all property ... 3
The two provisions form a complete constitutional pattern.
The 1920 Marion Report and the 1969 Study Committee355
each drafted an amendment to the constitution which would
have authorized classification. A constitutional change requires
submission of the proposed amendment to the people and their
approval of it.
353. See note 7 supra.
354. See note 9 supra.
355. See note 331 supra.
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